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ASEAN’s Role in the Democratization of Burma: 
An Analysis of Burma’s Transition and the use of ASEAN by International 
Actors to produce liberal change in the former “Rogue State” 
 
 
 
Erin McAuliffe 
The Ohio State University, USA 
 
 
This study analyzes the current liberalization of Burma within the democratization 
frameworks presented by Samuel P. Huntington (1991) and Juan J. Linz and 
Alfred C. Stepan (1996). Although liberalization in the direction of 
democratization began with the 2010 national election, an official democratic 
transition phase did not begin until the parliamentary by-elections in 2012. I use 
the frameworks of these scholars to present where Burma currently is in transition 
and what hinders the country from progress in its democratization. To explain the 
timing and reasons behind Burma’s democratization, I introduce independent 
variables from both Huntington’s Third Wave literature and international relations 
theories on sovereignty and legitimacy. These variables will be used to show 
how actors were able to use ASEAN, the regional organization encompassing 
Burma, to produce liberal change within the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Cold War period witnessed a new era of developing democracies. Former 
authoritarian regimes democratized, and many newly independent states created in the aftermath 
of colonization adopted democratic values from their colonizers. The end of the Cold War was 
marked by the triumph of Western values, notably liberal democracy and capitalism. This 
success was significant in the institutionalization and legitimation of democracy and individual 
freedoms, turning them into universally recognized values. States not willing to conform to the 
global trend, or states that specifically identified themselves against these values became 
stigmatized, many receiving the title of “rogue state” by the Western world. 
2  
Burma, a country located on the mainland of Southeast Asia, is an example of one of 
these stigmatized states that rejected the ideals of open markets, liberal democracy, and 
interdependence. Over the past half century, the more democratic values have become 
institutionalized and widespread, the more difficult it has become to be a valid player in the 
international system of states. For years, the Western world, particularly the United States, has 
engaged in a crusade for Western democracy, attempting to coerce states into transitioning to 
democracy, or intervening and forcibly implementing structures of democratic government. 
Burma is a unique case in that after 48 years of direct military rule, the longest surviving 
military dictatorship in the history of modern states, and extreme isolation, it opened up to the 
outside world, liberalizing economically and politically. Why did Burma suddenly begin to 
democratize after 48 years of oppressive military rule? I argue that the system of states is 
changing, creating a world where survival depends on a state's ability to be recognized as a 
cooperative and engaged player on an international playing field where democracy and human 
rights have defined the structure, making this structure the “only game in town.” Burma began 
liberalizing and progressing along a path of democratization in response to this changing system. 
Democratization was initiated in response to the need for recognition in the international system 
of states and institutions, which it believed obtainable through chairing ASEAN, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, the most important collective organization in the region. 
ASEAN was created during the Cold War time period. The association was established as 
a mechanism for the newly independent states of Southeast Asia to enhance their image in a world 
of powerful states and competing ideologies. Unlike the comparable organizations in the West, 
ASEAN was not concerned with spreading democracy or fostering international security 
through any type of legal framework. As a battleground of competing Cold War ideologies, and 
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an area recently freed from great power colonial rule, the Southeast Asian nations sought to 
develop an organization that would strengthen their international image and right to exist, while 
allowing them to organize their own political and economic systems as they pleased. 
Burma was admitted to ASEAN in 1997.
1 
For Burma, joining meant gaining recognition 
 
as a valid member of the Southeast Asian political community, which in turn it believed would 
grant it recognition at the international level. By the time of Burma's admittance, ASEAN had 
developed strong diplomatic ties with important Western actors, particularly the United States 
and the European Union. Because of this, not only had ASEAN as an organization gained 
recognition but the individual member states had as well, as successful dialogue partners of the 
Western actors. It was this recognition that Burma hoped to gain, having witnessed a level of 
success in obtaining recognition by the other member states. 
Burma's admittance did not win the successful recognition that it had desired, and it also 
threatened the credibility and legitimacy of ASEAN as a collective regional association. Western 
dialogue partners criticized the association and individual member states for admitting Burma, a 
country viewed by the West as rejecting international standards of democracy and human rights. 
They also asserted that Burma was now ASEAN's problem.
2 
Member states were caught in a 
limbo between upholding the important ASEAN principles of non-intervention and quiet 
diplomacy and protecting their relationships and state legitimacy with dialogue partners. The 
spread of democracy throughout Southeast Asia, mainly in Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Indonesia, also created political space for democratic values to be introduced to ASEAN and the 
other non-democratic members. 
                                                          
1
 Stephen McCarthy, “Burma and ASEAN: Estranged Bedfellows,” Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (2008): 911. 
2
 Lee Jones, ASEAN, sovereignty and intervention in Southeast Asia, (New York: Palgrave Macmillion, 2012), 190. 
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Issues of credibility and legitimacy for the association and its members only increased as 
the Burmese regime refused to acknowledge or ignored international criticism. Arguably the 
most threatening criticisms of both ASEAN and Burma came in 2005, the year before Burma 
was scheduled to chair the organization. Western dialogue partners threatened diplomatic and 
economic sanctions on the association, and individual member states were impelled to force 
Burma to step back. Burma relinquished its turn after being pressured by leaders of the individual 
member states on behalf of ASEAN. For Burma this signified a turning point where the regime 
realized that simply being a part of the organization would not earn international recognition. 
Although ASEAN spokespersons argue that the association is committed to a diplomacy in 
which individual state sovereignty is most important and member states will not intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other members, this commitment has clearly been abrogated. Turning down 
the right to chair the association in 2006 brought significant shame and embarrassment to the 
regime. I argue that the Burmese regime came to the realization that chairing the organization 
was the gateway to international recognition. 
In 2008 a Burmese constitution was drafted and passed; a national election was held in 
2010. Although corruption and oppression were evident in both events, unprecedented and 
unexpected change occurred when the military junta stepped down in 2011, turning over 
power to the newly elected President Thein Sein and national parliament. In the same year, 
Burma requested ASEAN to be allowed to chair the association in 2014, two years before its 
scheduled turn at that time. To much outside surprise and weariness on the part of its 
members, ASEAN accepted the request.
3 
For its part, based on its 2005-2006 experience, 
                                                          
3
 “ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations,” Address presented at Chair’s Statement of the 19th 
ASEAN Summit in Indonesia, Bali, (November 2011).  
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Burma recognized that it would need to maintain progress towards democratization in order 
to successfully be handed over the duties of chair in 2014. 
As a political analyst, I am intrigued by Burma's desire to chair the association only two 
years before its next scheduled turn, based on a 10 year rotation. Weighing the available evidence, 
I argue that the timing of liberal and democratic reforms in Burma can best be explained by the 
desire to chair the organization prior to the scheduled year, in order to show the rest of the world 
that it was capable of being an economically competitive and politically important state, 
particularly in the eyes of the United States and European Union. As chair, the country is 
responsible for planning, administering, and leading all summit and dialogue meetings among 
leaders of the member states and of other dialogue partners. For Burma, these responsibilities 
would prove to the West that it deserved recognition and credibility. 
My thesis is divided into three major parts, with subsections. Part I describes the concepts 
of democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation as defined by a variety of 
political scientists and internationally recognized organizations. All of these concepts come 
together to define democratization. The subsection on democracy shows the complexity of the 
concept and explains the differences between liberal and electoral democracies. In the subsections 
on transition and consolidation, I describe different theories of how democratic transition begins, 
how it progresses, and how a country consolidates its democracy based on hypotheses and 
frameworks developed by Samuel Huntington, and Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. 
 In Part II, I take the definitions and frameworks outlined in Part I and apply them to Burma, 
showing where Burma is in the democratic transition phase and what aspects of society are 
hindering further progress. I begin with a historical country analysis, outlining political aspects of 
the region in the pre-colonial era, highlighting the consequences of colonial rule for the 
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development of the state and military after independence, and discussing how military rule 
persevered into the 21
st 
century. I then explain the Burmese transition as a transition initiated by 
the authoritarian elites, using the hypotheses and frameworks outlined in Part II. Continuing with 
the framework of Linz and Stepan I explore the actions that have successfully furthered 
liberalization, as well as those that will prevent further progress unless changes are made. Part III 
answers the main theoretical question of my thesis, why did Burma democratize? In this part, I 
introduce international relations theories of sovereignty and legitimacy, as well as describe the 
important role that institutions play in creating and maintaining international order. From a 
chronological outline of events in Burma and responses from ASEAN, I develop the argument 
that the timing of significant liberalization can be explained through the desire to chair the 
association in hopes of obtaining international credibility and legitimacy as a state actor. 
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PART ONE: 
DEFINING DEMOCRACY, TRANSITION & CONSOLIDATION 
 
 
 
DEMOCRACY 
 
The most common element among political scientists for conditions defining democracy 
is the occurrence of free and fair elections. Robert Dahl proposed that democracy has two 
dimensions: contestation and participation in elections.
4 
Joseph Schumpeter’s “democratic 
model” defines a democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote.”5 Samuel Huntington elaborates further, defining a 20th century democratic 
political system as one that encompasses the ideas that the election must not only be free and fair, 
but also regular and that the entire adult population be eligible to vote. For elections to be 
considered free, certain basic civil and political rights must exist in society. In particular are the 
basic freedoms of speech, assembly and organization, which are necessary for open political 
debates and campaigns.
6 Leaders may be elected through free and fair elections, but once in 
power may not exercise real authority, instead acting in their own interests, or the interests of a 
specific group. A limitation on power becomes vital for democracy, meaning that elected leaders 
do not have the right to exercise total power and power is shared among other groups in society.
7
 
 Freedom House differentiates between an electoral democracy and a liberal democracy. 
For a country to qualify as an electoral democracy, there are four minimum standards that have 
to have been met in the last national election: a competitive, multiparty political system, 
                                                          
4
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave of Democratization in the late twentieth century. (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991) 7. 
5
 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy (New York: Harper & brothers, 1947) 269.  
6
 Huntington, 7. 
7
 Ibid., 10.  
8 
 
universal adult suffrage for all citizens, regularly contested elections with ballot security and 
secrecy and the absence of voter fraud, and open public access of political parties to the 
electorate through media usage and campaigning mechanisms.
8 A liberal democracy, on the 
other hand, encompasses all the basic requirements of an electoral democracy but includes the 
presence of civil liberties.
9 A rating of “FREE” by Freedom House requires that the country be 
both an electoral and a liberal democracy. Countries with “PARTLY FREE” ratings include 
countries that are electoral, but not liberal democracies.
10 
The process of liberalization is a necessary component of democratization. A country can, 
however, not be considered democratic solely because it has liberalized certain aspects of 
political and civil society. Liberalization entails policy and social changes administered by the 
regime that open up society in the direction of democracy.
11 
The liberalization of a country brings 
about the partial opening of the regime but does not go as far as to submit leaders to free and fair 
competitive elections.
12 Easing the censorship of media, introducing legal safeguards for 
individuals, releasing political prisoners, inviting exiled individuals to return, toleration of the 
opposition and the acceptance and allowance of groups and organizations in civil society are 
examples of liberalization efforts.
13 The liberalization of a country is a step towards 
democratization and is normally the preliminary step in a democratic transition period introduced 
by the authoritarian regime. Democratization includes liberalization, but goes further to include 
open contestation for the right to exercise control, creating the necessity for free and fair 
                                                          
8
 “Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” Freedom House, accessed September 2013.  
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Juan J. Linz & Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and post-communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 3.  
12
 Huntington, 9.  
13
 Linz & Stepan, 3.  
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elections.
14 Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring emphasize the establishment of institutions that 
allow for alteration in power as an essential component of democratization.
15 
Democratization is 
defined as the process that ends a nondemocratic regime, creates a democratic regime and 
consolidates the system.
16
 
 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
 
The transition to democracy begins first through ending authoritarian rule and the 
decision to hold national democratic elections, in which there is open contestation and no 
limitation on the right to participate, in both running for office and voting. Linz and Stepan have 
defined a democratic transition as complete when: 
Sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an 
elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result 
of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to 
generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power 
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with the other 
bodies de jure.
17
 
 
Within the political procedure, a date for the election, and for when the newly elected 
government will be sworn into office, needs to be set and agreed upon. This date, in turn, must 
be observed following the election, allowing for a turnover of power to the newly elected 
officials. The transition from an authoritarian government to a democratic government 
normally includes the creation of a new constitution, or major revisions to the existing 
constitution of the authoritarian state. For this reason, the government exercises de facto 
creation of the new policies and conditions of the future democratic government, as 
                                                          
14
 Linz & Stepan, 3.  
15
 Donald Share & Scott D. Mainwaring, “Transitions through transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain,” in 
Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects, ed. Wayne A. Selcher. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1986), 177.  
16
 Huntington, 9.  
17
 Linz & Stepan, 3.  
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democratic principles and procedures are not a de jure aspect of the constitution, given that a 
prior constitution exists. In the absence of a constitution, policies, laws and procedures must 
be created de facto until a constitution has been created, allowing for the authority and 
principles to become de jure concepts.
18 
 The separation of powers, particularly between the three recognized branches of 
government is an important aspect of democracy. Without the separation of powers, a checks 
and balance system will not endure. It is important in the transition period that there is a de 
jure separation between the executive, legislative and judicial powers, in order to create 
transparency between them. De jure separation is also important in ensuring that the judicial 
and legislative powers do not become an extension of the executive branch, and vice-versa.
19 
It allows for policies and procedures to be set in stone and available to the general public, 
making it more difficult for the government to make case-by-case and interest-based decisions. 
A move from a horizontal arrangement to a vertical arrangement of the three branches of 
government is an important aspect for a country during the transition phase. 
 Prior to announcing national elections, holding elections, and swearing a new government 
into office, the first step in the transition process is the decision to move from an authoritarian 
regime to a democratic government. Among democratization scholars, different terms are used to 
describe processes of transition. Samuel Huntington refers to three processes: “transformation,” 
democracy being brought in by the elites in power in the authoritarian government, 
“replacement,” democracy being brought about by opposition groups, and “transplacement,” 
                                                          
18
 Interpreted from the constitution-making contexts outlined by Linz & Stepan in Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe, 82-83, as well as from Linz’s 
discussion on the importance of constitution making in democratic transitions in “Transitions to Democracy,” 157. 
Juan J. Linz, “Transitions to Democracy,” The Washington Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1990): 157.  
19
 “Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology.” 
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democratic turnover through a joint action of government and opposition groups. Donald Share 
and Scott Mainwaring refer to three democratization processes as “breakdown or collapse,” 
similar to Huntington’s replacement transition, “extrication,” similar to Huntington’s 
transformation, and “transaction,” drawing on similarities to Huntington’s transplacement. A 
third scholar, Juan J. Linz, recognizes only two processes of transition and refers to them as 
“reforma-pactada” and “ruptura-pactada,” similar to Huntington's transformation and replacement 
respectively.
20
 
 Huntington argues that there are five major reasons why a transformation can take place. 
He states that elites may choose to move in a democratic direction due to increasing costs of 
staying in power. Second, elites hope to reduce potential future risks that would result from 
maintaining current power and losing it later. Third, elites use democratization in an attempt to 
combat declining legitimacy with the anticipation of renewing their legitimacy through elections. 
Fourth, elites may be motivated by reforms believing democracy would produce needed benefits 
for the country. Finally, the elites may believe that democracy is the correct form of 
government.
21 In this process, reformers obtain more control than the standpatters in the 
government. The reformers then need to subdue and convert the standpatters in government and 
foster a growing relationship with opposition groups in society. Lastly, a sense of inevitability 
about democratization needs to be created in order to establish the idea that it is the necessary and 
natural course of action.
22 Share and Mainwaring’s process of transition through extrication 
differs slightly in that it doesn’t focus on the levels of power between the government reformers 
and standpatters. It argues instead that due to low levels of legitimacy and internal cohesion the 
                                                          
20
 Huntington, 114.  
21
 Ibid., 127-129. 
22
 Ibid, 141-142. 
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authoritarian regime chooses to remove itself from power. The elites control the beginning stages 
of the transition by setting the timeline and limits on initial changes.
23
 
In a transition by replacement, the roles of the standpatters and reformers are switched 
from that of a transformation. In a situation where a replacement occurs, the standpatters are the 
dominant force in the government and the reformers are weak or non-existent. Therefore, 
democratization cannot be initiated by the government, since the standpatters are against regime 
change. In this case, a transition is initiated by the opposition forces in society. The opposition 
gains enough power that it causes the government to lose strength and collapse, or be 
overthrown. Key components to this transition process include mechanisms to cultivate generals 
and win enough military support, the need to create umbrella groups for the multitude of 
opposition forces to promote unity in the force, and the significant illegitimacy of the current 
authoritarian government.
24 Following the collapse or overthrow, unity among opposition groups 
becomes necessary in order to advance in the transition process after the fall, especially in 
deciding what type of democratic government to create and how to go about installing it.
25 
Share 
and Mainwaring also recognize a second transition process as a transition after regime 
breakdown or collapse, emphasizing that during this transition the elites exercise almost no role 
and, as a result, there are significant institutional changes brought about in the political and social 
realms.
26
  
The third possible transition to democracy shared in concept by Huntington and Share 
and Mainwaring is a process that involves negotiations and combined efforts of the government 
and the opposition. In Huntington’s transplacement, it is argued that the transition to a 
                                                          
23
 Share & Mainwaring, 178-179.   
24
 Huntington, 142-150. 
25
 Ibid., 150. 
26
 Share & Mainwaring, 178.  
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democratic government is the result of a balance between standpatters and reformers in 
government. Neither can unilaterally decide the future course of political development in the 
country because the opposition is not strong enough to bring down the government and the 
government recognizes its declining legitimacy and the increasing costs of non-negotiation.
27
 
Share and Mainwaring’s idea of transition through transaction emphasizes that transition is 
initiated by the regime, creating limits to the political changes and remaining a significant 
electoral force during transition. The regime begins liberalization efforts, while remaining at the 
forefront of political change. The power of the regime then declines as the process of 
liberalization increases, creating more room for negotiations and cooperation.
28
 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
 
 A successful free and fair election, and transition of power to the newly elected 
government, does not entail that a country is officially democratic. Following these stages of 
transition, the country enters into the final phase known as the democratic consolidation. The 
move from transition to consolidation is viewed by Freedom House as being a transition from 
an electoral democracy to a liberal democracy, the only condition in which a country can 
receive a rating of “FREE.” Regime survival, or the process of extending the life expectancy 
and securing the democratic advancements achieved during the transition period, is the classic 
definition of democratic consolidation.
29 Basic universally accepted components of 
consolidation include popular legitimacy, neutralization of anti-system actors, military 
subordination to civilians, stabilization of electoral rules and the decentralization of state 
                                                          
27
 Huntington, 151-152. 
28
 Share & Mainwaring, 175-176.  
29
 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998): 91 & 95.  
14 
 
power.
30 Huntington stresses the importance of military professionalism, which involves 
significant reductions in the size of the military, removing former military men from the 
government and consolidating the command structure over the armed forces to ensure that the 
civilian head of government is also the commander of the military.
31
 
The ability for those in power to be rotated and altered is an important guideline for 
measuring democratic consolidation. Huntington’s “two-turnover test” is a measurement that 
argues a democracy is consolidated when the originally elected leaders of the new democratic 
government lose a following election and acknowledge the turnover of power.
32 The willingness 
of elites to give up power acknowledges that democracy is “the only game in town” because it 
provides proof that both ruling elites and the general public are operating within the boundaries 
of the democratic system. It displays the leader's commitment to democracy through their 
willingness to step down and the public's trust in the system, by acknowledging that their 
response towards dissatisfaction with the government is to change the leaders and not the 
system.
33
 
 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan provide perhaps the most inclusive framework for 
democratic consolidation among democratization scholars, and will thus serve as the primary 
model for the purpose of this paper. They argue that a country has completed democratic 
consolidation when the entire democratic system has become “the only game in town.”34 Their 
framework encompasses three dimensions of consolidation: behavioral, attitudinal and 
                                                          
30
 Schedler, 91-92. 
31
 Huntington, 252-253. 
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Ibid., 267.  
34
 Linz & Stepan, 5.  
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constitutional.
35 Behaviorally, democratic consolidation is completed when there are no longer 
any significant social or political actors attempting to overthrow the regime or secede from the 
territory within the control of the regime. Attitudinally, a democratic regime has consolidated 
when a majority of the public believes that democratic procedures are the best and most effective 
way to govern and make changes. Constitutionally, democratic consolidation is completed when 
all actors, governmental and non-governmental, agree that conflict will be dealt with through 
established norms of laws and procedures.
36
 
 In addition to the three dimensions of consolidation, Linz and Stepan argue that five further 
interconnected arenas must be present before a state can complete the consolidation phase. These 
five arenas are a free civil society, autonomous and valued political society, a rule of law to 
uphold individual freedoms, a useable state bureaucracy and an institutionalized economic 
society.
37 Civil society is an aspect of the polity where relatively autonomous groups, 
associations, movements and individuals can express their values and interests. Religious groups, 
social movements, intellectual organizations and trade unions are important examples of a 
flourishing civil society.
38 Political society is needed not only for democratic transition but also 
consolidation. This is the area where political actors have the right to compete and contest for the 
right to exercise control over the demos. Key aspects are parties, with the task of representing 
differences between democrats, established democratic norms, and procedures of conflict 
regulation, institutionalized routinization, intermediation between the political and civil societies, 
and compromise.
39 An established and respected rule of law must exist for consolidation to be 
                                                          
35
 Linz & Stepan, 5.  
36
 Ibid., 6. 
37
 Ibid., 7. 
38
 Ibid.  
39
 Ibid., 8-10.  
16 
 
completed. All actors must be held accountable to the law and citizens be granted access to courts 
to defend their rights. Under the rule of law there is a need for a “spirit of constitutionalism,” or a 
strong consensus to the constitution and a commitment to the “self- binding” procedures of 
governance that require significant majorities to alter. A strong and democratic rule of law calls 
for an independent judicial system that functions within a strong legal culture.
40 These three 
aspects: the civil society, political society and rule of law, underline the prerequisite conditions to 
democratic consolidation. 
 Fourth, a formal, functioning state and state bureaucracy need to exist in order for 
democratic consolidation to be carried out. This allows the democratic government the “effective 
capacities to command, regulate, and extract,” allowing it to exercise its “claim to the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force in the territory.”41 This is necessary in order to protect citizens’ 
rights and effectively deliver basic goods and services to the public. The fifth condition for 
democratic consolidation is an institutionalized economic society. Since democracies can neither 
be command economies or pure market economies, an economic society, or a set of socio-
politically accepted norms, institutions and regulations must be created to provide mediation 
between the state and the market.
42 When the conditions for the three dimensions, as well as the 
five further aspects, are met, Linz & Stepan argue that a democratic state has successfully 
undergone democratic transition.  
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Linz & Stepan, 10.  
41
 Ibid., 11.  
42
 Ibid. 
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PART TWO: 
BURMA’S STATUS IN TRANSITION & CONSOLIDATION 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Part I, I have outlined the framework for understanding democracy, democratic 
transition and democratic consolidation. A general chronology has been established to identify 
when a democratic transition begins, when the transition has ended and become a process of 
consolidation, and when consolidation is complete. Given this framework, where on the 
democratization ladder is Burma? Part II of my thesis will answer this question using the methods 
and definitions analyzed in Part I. I argue that Burma is still in the very early stages of transition. 
In 2008 Burma ratified a new constitution and in 2010 held national elections. Both of these 
fulfilled requirements on Burma's seven-step roadmap to democracy, which will be discussed in 
detail later in this section. Although these actions are important features of liberalization in 
Burma, they do not constitute part of the transition phase. I view these actions as prerequisites or 
preliminary mechanisms to legitimate democratization. The transition began 
with the by-election of 2012, the first instance in modern Burma where fair and free, 
internationally monitored elections took place,
43 
and all political parties, besides those in the war 
infected Kachin state, were eligible to run for contested seats.
44 
The next election in 2015 will be 
the judge to determine how far Burma has come in its transition phase, and if it can move on to 
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consolidation. 
 Following Linz and Stepan's definition of a democratic transition, the transition in Burma 
will not be completed until political procedures and electoral laws are agreed upon by all actors, 
a new government comes to power as the result of free and fair elections, and there is separation 
between the three branches of government. The laws drafted into the 2008 Constitution are not 
agreed upon by all actors. The process was controlled by the military, as the military junta was 
the ruling party throughout the drafting process, and excluded key stakeholders, notably the 
NLD.
45 
The military institutionalized and secured its power in the constitution. The 2008 
Constitution allows the military to dissolve the civilian government if the security of the state is 
at stake. The military is not accountable to the civilian government, having the right to 
administer its own affairs. The constitution also reserves a quarter of the seats in both houses for 
military members appointed by the commander in chief.
46 
Before the 2010 national election, the 
military regime handpicked the election commission and wrote the election laws, favoring the 
military party.
47 
Burma cannot progress in the transition phase until significant constitutional 
amendments are made with regards to military immunity and rights, and the election laws and 
commission selection are revisited and addressed by all parties. 
Democratic transition entails a new, democratic government created by free and fair 
monitored elections. The 2010 elections were not monitored by any recognized international 
observers, the NLD was not represented, and there were allegations of the election being rigged 
and infiltrated with voting irregularities.
48 
The 2010 elections were not democratic and did not 
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result in a democratic government. I view these elections as a preamble to the democratic 
transition, in that significant liberal steps were taken by the regime to install a “civilian” 
government, a move unprecedented in the history of Burma's military government, but that they 
fell short of installing a real democracy, as military leaders still dominate executive, legislative 
and judicial affairs. 
Currently there is little separation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches 
of the government, and all are either dominated or controlled by the military. The executive 
branch is headed by President Thein Sein, former general and Prime Minister of the military 
regime.
49 
Both houses of the legislative branch reserve twenty-five percent of the seats for 
military members appointed by the commander in chief. Since seventy-five percent agreement is 
needed to pass a bill, the military is able to control which bills are passed and rejected.
50 
The 
judiciary is not independent from the other two branches. Judges are appointed or approved by the 
government and must adhere to the decrees of the government in evaluating cases.
51 
Since the 
military still has the most authority in the executive and legislative branches, appointed judges 
must have the military's approval. The “Administrative Detention Law” states that individuals 
may be held without charge, trial or access to legal counsel for up to five years if their act in 
question has threatened the security or sovereignty of the state.
52 
Military members, especially 
those from the former military junta have blanket immunity for all official acts, making them 
independent of the judiciary.
53 
In order for transition to progress, the judiciary needs to be 
established as an independent body, and all individuals need to be considered equal under the law. 
 The government installed after the 2010 elections can hardly be considered a democratic 
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government. Although the international community witnessed many liberal reforms, including a 
government turn-over, the 2010 elections only reinforced military rule through a democratic 
facade. The military still controls all three branches of government and is considered to be above 
politics, or above the law. The 2012 by-elections can be viewed as the first stage of the 
democratic transition, however. Although not a national election where all seats were able to be 
contested, 2012 was the first election where there was open contestation and registration 
restrictions were lifted. The 2012 elections were free, fair and monitored by international 
observers. By these standards, Burma is barely two years into its democratic transition. Until 
significant constitutional reforms are made, the ethnic diaspora situation is resolved and the 
judiciary becomes an independent body, Burma cannot progress very far in transition. This next 
section, Part II, will examine in detail Burma's position in transition and outline what needs to 
happen later for consolidation, based on Linz and Stepan's framework. I will begin with a brief 
history of British colonization in Burma and the rise of military dominance, in order to outline 
where military rule came from and how the ethnic conflict arose.  
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
 Pre-colonial Burma, like many of its Southeast Asian neighbors, existed not as a modern 
state, but as a territory under different ruling kingdoms. The administrative structure of what is 
today known as Burma, prior to British invasion, was divided into three zones, as established by 
the Restored Toungoo and Konbaung dynasties.
54  
The first zone, or nuclear zone, was the 
‘center’ of the kingdom where the king had the most control and an established power center 
with ministries and a military. The remaining two zones were further from the king’s direct 
sphere of influence. The second zone was the zone of dependent provinces. These provinces 
                                                          
54
 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009): 23.  
21 
 
were run by myo-wun, or agents of the king with centrally appointed cabinets, who represented 
the monarchy in the provincial capitals. The third zone was the zone of tributaries. These zones 
are what we refer to as the modern day ethnic states on the periphery of Burma. They were run 
by hereditary leaders from their respective ethnic backgrounds. They were allowed to administer 
their states as they pleased, as long as they did not pose a threat to the monarch and paid their 
allegiance to the central court through certain obligations.
55 Within each zone, the responsibilities 
of state administration and day-to-day governing were divided even further among local elites, 
chiefs and centrally elected staff. This resulted in an expansive administrative system with a 
complex web of subordinate authorities. Patron-client relationships emerged, especially in areas 
further from the center.
56
 
This web resulted in administrative difficulties in maintaining order. Military strength 
thus provided the means for keeping order in pre-colonial Burma.
57 The king’s army protected 
the central state against external enemies and maintained dominance and control over internal 
rivals.
58 The legitimacy and power of the king was measured in his ability to maintain order and 
welfare and uphold the dhamma, or Buddhist laws of nature. Therefore, the king was able to rely 
on force to maintain order in the kingdom.
59
 
 There existed no formal legal codes in pre-colonial Burma. The state judiciary system 
was not centrally administered, and was placed in the hands of peripheral rulers: the provinces, 
townships and villages. Unlike what existed in early modern Europe at the time, laws and 
decisions were based on ‘reasonableness’ and not on de jure legality. The central state provided 
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an unregulated ‘guide’ of legal codes, but set no formalized legal system or set of constitutional 
laws. This resulted in a lack of uniform decisions in the kingdom, allowing decisions to be made 
on a case-by-case basis and permitted the individual inequality of the hierarchical, patron-client 
system of the state to persevere.
60
  
Anglo-Burmese Wars and the Establishment of British Rule 
The lack of centralized authority in pre-colonial Burma resulted in the inability of the 
king and the state to defend itself against the influence and invasion from British India.
61  The 
first Anglo-Burmese war, from 1824-1826, resulted in the concessions of some territory to 
British India. The strategic geographical position of Burma, located between India and China 
with vital maritime trade access in the Bay of Bengal, as well as an abundance of natural 
resources, were some of the factors that motivated the British Empire to continue expanding 
eastward.
62
  
In the Second Anglo-Burmese War, from 1852-1853, more land concessions were made 
to British India. Most important was the annexation of the Lower Irrawaddy Delta, an important 
source for economic revenue to the nucleus. This annexation significantly weakened the 
economic resources of the kingdom.
63 Bagan Min, king at the time of the second Anglo-Burmese 
War, was removed from the throne and replaced with Mindon Min. Mindon Min attempted to 
install new reforms to try to centralize control over the periphery. Under his reforms he was able 
to improve central control by increasing the responsiveness of local officials to the center.
64
 
The Third Anglo-Burmese War lasted from 1885 to 1886 and brought the entirety of the 
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Burmese kingdom and peripheral lands under the control of British India.
65  The biggest change 
for the people under British rule was the introduction of an administrative system that detached 
the public and private spheres from one another and changed the relationship between state and 
society.
66 
Unlike the traditional ruling system of Burma, which involved an interconnected 
relationship of the king to the private sphere of society, the British differentiated between public 
and private life, and remained detached from the private sphere of society.
67  The British further 
centralized power and introduced many Western ideas of justice, law and economics. These 
included the attempt to introduce a code of law in which all individuals, including government 
elites, were treated equal.
68
  
The British divided the territory into two administrative zones: “Burma Proper,” which 
involved the nucleus and the dependent zones, and the “excluded” or “frontier areas,” which 
encompassed ethnic minority states in the periphery.
69 The British introduced very distinct 
territorial boundaries to Burma, including the peripheral areas. However, the British did not 
maintain firm control over the frontier areas, viewing these as areas of little economic 
significance and threat to the center. They therefore continued to leave most of the responsibility 
in the hands of local chiefs.
70
 
 The British used coercion to maintain control in Burma during their rule. The time period 
following the Third Anglo-Burmese War from 1886 to 1896, referred to as ‘Pacification,’ 
restored order by suppressing rebellions through the use of the military.
71  Similar to most other 
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colonization processes happening throughout Asia and Africa, a de facto military administration 
was established and force was used to control the population and defend the colonial 
administration from local threats. Since the purpose of colonialism in the 1900s was not for the 
purpose of state building, relationships between colonial elites and locals were depersonalized, 
and fostered the creation of a command relationship between the state and civil society.
72  The 
further centralization of the state and introduction of a de jure code of laws allowed for the 
British to enforce the law through centrally administered armed police forces in the nucleus and 
periphery.
73  The security of the colonial state was maintained primarily through armed forces 
that operated as an extension of the army of the Indian Empire. The police forces were also 
composed mainly of Indian nationals and were divided into two units, one for the central zone 
and one for the frontier and excluded territories. The British used the established system of law 
to justify the use of military and police force.
74
 
The Nationalist Response 
 Nationalism in Burma rose in part due to the creation of a plural society as Burma 
became part of the world market around the time of the First World War.
75 The commercial 
market economy in Burma was controlled mainly by Europeans, Chinese and Indian migrants, 
while the Burmese
76 
worked primarily in the agricultural sector.
77 There was no unity among 
these actors, who made up the plural society in Burma. Nationalism further arose due to the 
rationalization of the village administration, as anti-state sentiments grew among the peasantry 
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and local indigenous population.
78 The rise of ethnic nationalism occurred during the early years 
of British occupation, as the people of those territories where the British had decreased the 
authority of local leaders desired to develop unique identity for their people.
79
 
The strongest sense of nationalism among the colonized population of Burma arose as an 
opposition to British occupation. The Burman people believed that they were one nation with a 
sovereign right to self-determination and self-government. To these people, British rule was 
illegitimate since 'their nation' was being ruled by ‘aliens’ of another nation.80  Since the Burman 
ethnic group was the largest, situated at the center and making up the majority of the growing 
local middle class, the Burmans attempted to homogenize the entire country through a process 
called “Burmanization,” or efforts aimed at creating a country based on Burman ideals. These 
Burmanization efforts were primarily led by active Burman youth nationalist groups. “Burmese 
people,” on the other hand, refers to the citizens of Burma and is not limited to one specific 
ethnic group. However, Burmese often becomes synonymous with Burman, as the Burmans view 
themselves as the only legitimate ethnicity of the country. 
 A growing middle class among the Burman population and an increasingly active student 
youth further provoked the sense of nationalism and need for an independent country. After 
formal separation from India, granted through the “Government of Burma Act” in 1935, some 
Burman politicians sought assistance and alliance with the Japanese.
81 The two major youth 
nationalist groups that led the movement for independence in the 1930s were the ABSU, All 
Burma Students’ Union, and the Do Bama Asiayon, or Thakins. Do Bama Asiayon translates into  
“Our  Burma  Association”, or  “We  Burmans”  and  “Thakin” is  an  old  Burmese  word 
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meaning master, demonstrating that they are the 'masters of Burma.'
82  Both groups demonstrate 
the Burman domination over the nationalist movement and desire for the homogenization of the 
state as a state for Burmans. 
Japanese Occupation and Independence 
 After the Japanese wrestled control from the British in 1942, the Ba Maw administration 
took over state affairs from the occupying Japanese army. He called for “one blood, one voice, 
one command,”83 an appeal for a nation-state sense of loyalty for Burma and a call for the further 
Burmanization of the country. The Ba Maw administration faced complications from rival 
centers of authority and poor communication ability. This period of political control in Burma 
was a period in which groups could not unify on a way to administer the country. Groups fought 
for control with their different ideals for the new independent society.
84
 
 The first government of independent Burma was led by U Nu, a former Thakin. Due to a 
lack of unity and factions among independence groups, the administration lost most of its 
support after independence.
85 Nu’s administration was unable to exercise much power outside of 
Rangoon, as Burma’s ethnic minorities felt no connection to the growing Burman identity of the 
independent state and continued to administer their areas independently. U Nu was unable to 
unify or develop an orderly civil society in independent Burma, causing his administration to 
invite General Ne Win and a caretaker government to take over from 1958-1960 in order to 
forestall armed conflict and bring order back to the state. Particular fear was placed on the 
possibilities of the communists taking power from a weak U Nu administration. As planned, 
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administrative power was handed back to civilians with a national election in 1960, in which Nu’s 
Union Party won.
86
 Within a year the party had little remaining support and on March 2, 1962 a 
military coup staged by Ne Win overthrew U Nu and Burma’s civilian government, beginning 
Burma’s 48 years of military rule.87 
Military Rule and Opposition 
 
Ne Win and his revolutionary council justified the takeover of Burma “in the name of 
ensuring continued unity of the nation.”88 They blamed the weakness of Burma’s independent 
society on democracy and federalism, justifying the removal of these institutions.
89 On April 30, 
1962 the revolutionary council that overthrew the government established its own ruling council, 
the BSPP, Burmese Socialist Programme Party, which initiated the “Burmese Way to Socialism” 
ideology that drove state policy and development from 1962 to 1988.
90  In 1964, Ne Win and the 
BSPP passed the “Law to Protect National Solidarity,” which required all organizations in the 
Union to register and all political parties, with the exception of the BSPP, to hand their assets 
over to the state.
91
 
 The late 1980s marked the next period of significant political turmoil for Burma. In 1987, 
the United Nations declared Burma an LDC, Least Developed Country, bringing humiliation and 
embarrassment to the country.
92 In March of that year the Japanese government threatened to end 
their aid program with Burma if new economic reforms were not implemented. The few new 
reforms that were initiated after this threat caused an increase in the price of everyday goods, and 
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demonetized banknotes without compensation.
93 These responses sparked a series of student 
protests in Rangoon and other cities throughout Burma. On July 23, 1988, Ne Win announced his 
resignation and the resignation of other senior party leaders. Behind the scenes, he called for the 
army to take over in a full military coup and for the BSPP, as a party, to be dissolved.
94 The 
events between March and September 1988 showed that the army lacked the credibility and 
public support needed to maintain public order without the use of violence, but also embellished 
the army’s justification for controlling the state, depicting the army as the savior of the nation.95 
The new military junta adopted the name SLORC, State Law and Order Restoration 
Council, and was chaired by General Saw Maung.
96  SLORC nullified the 1974 Constitution that 
had been implemented under Ne Win and the BSPP. The army declared martial law, assumed all 
executive, legislative and judicial powers and replaced civilian courts with military courts.
97
 
Elections were held on May 27, 1990 in order to elect representatives to draw up a constitution. 
The junta declared that the constitution was first necessary to yield a transfer of power in 
accordance with the law.
98  Voter turnout was estimated at over seventy percent and the NLD, 
National League for Democracy, the major opposition party, received fifty-two percent of the 
votes. On July 27, 1990 SLORC issued Declaration 1/90, which restated that the transfer of 
power would happen according to the laws of a constitution.
99 There was no timeline set for how 
long the process would take. Power was not handed over and Aung San Suu Kyi was placed 
under house arrest. 
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In 1997 SLORC changed its name to the SPDC, State Peace and Development Council, 
after gaining membership in ASEAN in July of that year.
100  Following Burma’s admittance into 
ASEAN,  the  organization  came  under  increased  pressure  from  Western  countries  and 
institutions. In 2000 Aung San Suu Kyi was again put under house arrest.
101 
She was released in 
2002 and proceeded, with formal permission, in 2003 to tour the country giving speeches and 
reopening NLD offices in order to reconnect with members of the party as well as the people of 
Burma.
102  On May 30, 2003 her convoy was attacked near the town of Depayin. Several people 
died and Aung San Suu Kyi was captured and held at Insein prison before being placed under 
house arrest again.
103 Following the Depayin incident, ASEAN experienced a significant increase 
in international pressure to act on Burma’s violations of human rights. 
Following the Depayin incident, General Khin Nyunt, Prime Minister at the time, 
established a “seven-step roadmap to democracy,” in response to increasing international 
pressure and criticism.
104 The seven steps included: reconvening the national convention, the 
implementation of the process for the emergence of a genuine democratic system, the drafting of 
a constitution, the adoption of the new constitution through a referendum, constitutionally held 
legislative elections, and the formation of a new government and other constitutional bodies.
105
 
The National Convention began in 1993 following the 1990 election and was to serve the 
purpose of drafting a new constitution for Burma. It was suspended in 1996 and reconvened in 
2004, as step one under the seven step roadmap to democracy.
106
 
A sudden price increase for diesel and natural gas provoked protests starting in August 
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2007.
107
 The military junta arrested many of the protestors and proceeded to patrol the streets on 
a daily basis to prevent any further demonstrating. Following the arrests, a small group of monks 
took to the streets in peaceful marches, chanting the metta sutta
108 
of loving kindness; attempting 
to enlighten the regime on the suffering it was causing the population of Burma.
109 
By early 
September the number of monks had significantly increased, and the protests had become more 
political. Members of the military silenced the protests by arresting and beating some of the 
monks.
110 
 On September 18, 2007, the protests increased in size as monks from major cities, such as 
Rangoon, Mandalay, Sittwe, as well as other small towns across the country, gathered at their 
local temples and began peacefully marching in the streets chanting the metta sutta. Initially, 
ordinary citizens were not allowed to join, as the monks felt that the peaceful and religion 
centered aspect of the protest would prevent authorities from resorting to violence to cease the 
demonstration. Eventually lay citizens were allowed to join in lines on both sides of the monks. 
The ABMA, All Burma Monks' Alliance, was the driving force behind the movement.
111  On 
September 26, 2007, U Kosita, one of the leaders of the monks' protest, gave a speech in front of 
the famous Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon, asking police and soldiers to stop their harm against 
citizens.  Starting  on  that  day,  monks  were  beaten,  shot  and  arrested,  as  were  many 
photographers, journalists and lay persons.
112 Because of the color of the monk's robes, the event 
became known as the “Saffron Rebellion” or “Saffron Massacre.”113   Some images and reports 
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reached international organizations and Western countries,
114 
sparking yet again an increase of 
pressure on both Burma and ASEAN. 
On May 3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis devastated Burma’s Irrawaddy Delta, in addition to 
causing flooding throughout the rest of the region.
115 
The natural catastrophe left over 130,000 
people dead or missing and over 1.5 million people displaced. The regime refused to allow aid 
workers and agencies into the country, claiming to be upholding the principle of non-interference 
in national sovereignty.
116 The national referendum was set to take place on May 10, a week after 
Cyclone Nargis devastated parts of the country.
117  Despite the current humanitarian crisis, the 
junta refused to postpone the referendum to a later date. It was only pushed back by two weeks 
in highly affected areas of the Delta. Official results of the referendum published by the 
government showed that there was a 92.4% voter turnout, despite the natural disaster. The new 
constitution was passed, despite high levels of presumed manipulation. 
TRANSITION 
 
Introduction 
 
 Burma has undergone political liberalization since the Depayin incident in May 2003, 
paving the way for a democratic transition process that began with the 2012 by-elections. 
Although no timeline for completion was created, the move towards transition was implied 
through the creation of the seven step road map to constitutional government in August of that 
year. The constitution was passed in 2008, however without the participation of the NLD and 
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Aung San Suu Kyi, as they had boycotted the convention.
118  The elections held in 2010 were 
neither free nor fair and resulted in reinforced military rule. However, both the 2008 Constitution 
and the 2010 elections were steps outlined on the seven step road map to democracy and were 
significant in paving the way for a democratic transition. 
The 2010 Elections: Liberalization but not Democratization 
The elections held on November 7, 2010 were shy of initiating a legitimate democratic 
transition because they were neither free nor fair and reinforced the military's rule. Through the 
2008 Constitution and 2010 elections the military attempted to transition to a democracy through 
a transformation, to use the language of political scientist Samuel Huntington (see Part I). 
Although some transformations result in democratic rule, the transformation in Burma that 
occurred following the 2010 elections did not. Linz and Stepan, the other major democratization 
theorists, argue that a democratic transition begins with the decision to end authoritarian rule and 
hold national elections in which there is open contestation and no limitation on participation. The 
national elections held in 2010 placed many restrictions on party participants, as well as on 
voters. The transformation that took place as a result of the 2010 elections, a government 
transition initiated by the elites of the authoritarian regime, did not end authoritarian rule, it only 
reinforced it through a democratic facade. For this reason, the transition that took place following 
the 2010 election cannot be considered a democratic transition. 
 At the time of the November 7, 2010 elections, there was an absence of vertical 
accountability and separation of powers between the branches of government. As part of the 
definition of a democratic transition, there is expected to be a separation between the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches before holding democratic elections. Going into the 2010 
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elections, the government of Burma was still controlled by the military and all local and central 
levels of the administrative and legislative branches were under control of the military’s official 
political party, the USDP, Union Solidarity and Development Party.
119 
Being a military run 
country, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches were all being run by the same people, 
allowing for little to no separation of powers through the elections. The election was believed to 
be rigged as 76 percent of the votes to nonmilitary appointed seats were won by the USDP.
120
 
Further issues with the November 7, 2010 election were the restrictions on party 
registration and campaigning. Although the “Political Parties Registration Law” prohibits the use 
of state property or funds for campaigning, the USDP utilized funds and property from the 
USDA, Union Solidarity and Development Association, a government-organized social welfare 
organization, to its benefit in the election. It privatized the organization under the USDP in July 
2010 by turning all of its property over to the party.
121 Restrictions were placed on party and 
candidate registration through extremely high registration fees, estimated at $250,000 US dollars, 
and fines for losing contested seats.
122
 
 Despite overwhelming control remaining in the hands of the military, there were many 
non-military representatives, including some from ethnic political parties, elected to the 
parliament for the first time. Additionally, the military officially dissolved the military junta, the 
SPDC, and Thein Sein was required to step down from his military position in order to take over 
as the newly elected president of the country.
123  As an important aspect of transformation, these 
steps taken by authoritarian elites reflect the use of elections and democratic elements to attempt 
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to legitimize themselves and their rule.
124 
As the ideas of democracy become more legitimized as 
the only acceptable form of government in the international arena, the Burmese elites attempted 
to use a transformation, where they would be able to control and limit initial changes and 
hopefully legitimize their right to rule. Although shy of true democratic transition, the 2010 
elections did witness unprecedented liberal changes in the Burmese government. New actors 
became involved in the political system and reformers of the former military government were 
able to gain a stronger voice in the new government, paving the way for a more successful 
transition in 2012. This period also witnessed the creation of fourteen regional assemblies with 
the idea that ethnic groups within Burma’s boundaries would gain a voice in politics.125 
Although 2010 was the first time Burma conducted an election with some democratic 
elements, I argue that these elections did not mark the beginning of the democratic transition 
period. Instead, the by-elections of 2012, in which Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD acquired 43 
of the 45 contested seats, mark the initial stages of democratic transition in Burma. These seats 
became open for by-elections after certain members were moved over to the executive branch in 
the creation of new presidential positions and committees.
126 
The 2012 by-elections marked the 
beginning of the democratic transition phase as they were the first elections in which previously 
excluded political actors were allowed to participate, and the government acknowledged the 
results and handed over power. Additionally, the by-elections in 2012 were monitored by a 
number of international and regional observers, observers, and international media sources were 
welcomed into the country. Besides participation restrictions in the Kachin state, there were no 
limitations or restrictions on voters or individuals and parties contesting seats. 
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The year 2012 also witnessed a number of political reformers in the government gaining 
higher positions under President Thein Sein. Towards the end of August 2012, he reshuffled his 
cabinet, moving and removing ministers from their current positions. He moved Kyaw San, a 
hardliner, from his position as minister of information to minister for cooperatives, a position 
which oversaw very little. The position for minister of information was fulfilled by Aung Kyi, a 
reformer. Conservative Vice President Tin Aung Myint Oo resigned and was replaced by Nyan 
Tun, a political moderate.
127
 
Despite a successful transition following the by-elections of 2012, Burma still remains at 
the early stages of democratic transition. Transition cannot be completed without changes to the 
current 2008 Constitution. Referring back to Linz and Stepan's definition of a completed 
democratic transition, the transition is not complete until “sufficient agreement has been reached 
about political procedures to produce an elected government and when a new government comes 
to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote.”128 
Additionally, there needs to be a separation of powers between the three branches of 
government. The procedures outlined in the 2008 Constitution to produce an elected government 
are not agreed upon by many opposition groups, namely the NLD which boycotted the 
referendum.
129 
Currently, the 2008 Constitution de jure reinforces military rule in all three 
branches of government and allows the military to remain “above politics.” The constitution also 
allows for a certain number of seats in both houses to be filled with appointed military members. 
Until changes are made, allowing all contested seats to be open to elected civilians, a new 
national government that is the direct result of a free vote cannot be obtained. The next national 
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election is set to be held in 2015, and in order for the election to foster progress in the transition 
phase, significant constitutional amendments will need to be addressed and made. The details of 
the 2008 Constitution and the limits it places on democratization will be addressed in the next 
section. In order to highlight some successful elements of democratic transition, as well as 
outline in detail elements prohibiting further transition and progression towards consolidation, I 
will use Linz and Stepan's framework for democratic consolidation. Although Burma is nowhere 
near the consolidation phase, the elements provided by Linz and Stepan's framework can be 
utilized to show how, without changes, Burma will be unable to move out of the transition phase 
and into consolidation. 
LINZ AND STEPAN’S CONSOLIDATION FRAMEWORK 
Addressing the limits for a successful transition and progression towards consolidation 
Behavioral 
 Currently, one of the biggest threats to the new democracy in Burma is the threat from 
ethnic minority groups. The conflict in the western Rakhine state has caused constant violence 
since 2012 when tensions between Muslims and Buddhists flared up again.
130 
Despite being 
included within the territorial boundaries of Burma, the Rohingyan Muslims do not hold 
citizenship. Little is being done by either Thein Sein or Aung San Suu Kyi to address and 
improve the situation. Unlike Indonesia, an example of a former colonized Southeast Asian 
country that has undergone democratization, which stressed decentralization in its democratic 
process, both Aung San Suu Kyi and Thein Sein have been concerned with strengthening the 
political core at the center and centralizing the democracy. When asked about the violence in the 
Rakhine state, Aung San Suu Kyi denied the occurrence of ethnic cleansing and argued that the 
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international arena needed to turn its attention to the democratic transition at the center, 
particularly the need for a new constitution.
131
 
The Kachin and Shan states are two further examples of large ethnic minorities which 
governed themselves prior to British invasion. Many large ethnic communities were  even 
granted special rights as allies of the British during British rule, or were ignored as they posed 
little to no threat. Since independence from the British, the idea of “Burma for Burmans” has 
become deeply rooted in society.
132 
The inhabitants of most ethnic states and territories are 
denied citizenship and are seeking autonomous power. 
Indonesian democracy has largely been successful through the decentralization of the 
government and the granting of special rights and autonomous powers to threatening ethnic 
regions. Taking the ideas of a federal system, particularly that of Germany, the legislature in 
1999 transferred significant authority to the district level.
133 
The regions of Indonesia, Aceh and 
Papua, were granted special autonomous rights after fighting against the state and threatening to 
secede from the nation. East Timor was also granted full independence after years of violence 
and fighting.
134 
The decentralization to the local levels and the special autonomous rights granted 
to certain ethnic groups has allowed Indonesia to persist as a democratic state, and provides a 
successful model for one way Burma could improve its legitimacy and democracy. 
Burma’s ethnic diversity creates a “stateness” issue within the country, causing one of the 
largest, if not the primary, hindrances to Burma’s democratization. Linz and Stepan argue that 
there is a triadic inter-relationship between the modern state, modern nationalism and modern 
                                                          
131
 Penny Green, “Islamophobia: Burma’s racist fault-line,” Race and Class 55, no. 2 (2013): 97.  
132
 Callahan, Making Enemies: War and state building in Burma, 37-39.  
133
 R. William Liddle & Saiful Mujani, “Indonesian democracy: From transition to consolidation,” in Democracy and 
Islam in Indonesia, ed. Mirjam Kuenkler and Alfred C. Stepan. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 129.  
134
 Liddle & Mujani, 35-37.  
38 
 
democracy.
135 Democracy, they argue, cannot exist without a sovereign state.
136 
These three 
principles become intertwined because the modern democratic state is based on participation of 
the demos. Demos, or populace in a democratic sense, can be defined in numerous ways. An 
issue of stateness can arise when nationalism, as one possible definition for the demos, does not 
agree with the demos of the state.
137
  
The state is the necessary prerequisite to modern democracy because democracy by 
definition is a form of government of a modern state. To have democracy, a demos of the state is 
required. There are three accepted principles as to how citizenship is defined, in turn creating a 
legal demos of the state. One acquires citizenship ius sanguinis (by descent), ius soli (by birth), 
or by asking for and being granted the right to citizenship, as in some cases of immigration.
138 All 
three of these are linked in one way or another to the state, by being born from someone with 
citizenship of that state, being born inside the territorial boundaries of that state, or by being 
granted the right to citizenship of that particular state. This explains why the modern state is 
necessary before democracy can become a reality; without a state you have no citizens, which in 
turn provide no demos to partake in a democracy.
139 The “stateness problem” then occurs “when 
there are profound differences about territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and 
profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in the state.”140 
The process of state building emerged in the 15th century as a result of the reformation in 
Europe and the decline of feudalism. As modern states emerged, concern was not focused on 
encompassing a population sharing a similar history, language and culture within a territorial 
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boundary. The creation of the state was not a result of natural social boundaries separating 
people, but rather the result of creating concrete, identifiable administrative and political 
institutions for a defined demos.
141 According to Mary Callahan, state building “refers to 
processes in which state actors and institution managers organize resources and personnel so as 
to extend the geographical and functional “reach of the state” or institution.”142 
A nation, compared to the concept of a state, is based on certain values and has no 
autonomy, no agents and no rules.
143 
This eliminates the legitimacy behind the rights and 
behaviors of the demos defining themselves in the nation. A nation can, however, exercise power 
and utilize violence to challenge the state.
144 A nation evolves as a specific population develops a 
sense of internal, psychological sense of community or connection.
145 When the demos of the 
majority nation become the ruling elites of the state, a nation-state develops. The policies of a 
nation-state are centered on increasing cultural homogeneity, resulting in the language, religion 
and cultural practices of the dominant nation becoming the privileged or official practices of the 
state. Means of socialization, such as textbooks and media sources, become controlled and 
restricted by state officials, in order to develop and strengthen a homogenous cultural identity.
146 
Linz and Stepan argue that nondemocratic states with a high degree of nation-state 
heterogeneity will experience severe difficulties in democratic transitions.
147  The higher the 
percentage of people living within the territorial boundaries of the state who do not want to be 
members of that state and do not accept the legitimate claims of that government, the more 
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difficult democratic transitions will be.
148 They establish a hypothesis for improving democratic 
transitions in multicultural settings, stating that “the chances to consolidate democracy are 
increased by state policies that grant inclusive and equal citizenship and that give all citizens a 
common “roof” of state-mandated and enforced individual rights.”149 Multinational states that 
have developed these policies and experienced successful democratic transition are referred to as 
“state-nations.” Leading examples of these are  the  United  States,  Switzerland and  India.150 
Indonesia is also a strong example of a state-nation, one that could become the basic model for 
democratization efforts in Burma as a former Southeast Asian colony and military dictatorship, 
as well as a fellow ASEAN member. Among the many cultures, religions, languages and demos, 
Indonesia has managed to create an “Indonesian” identity that acts as an umbrella identity while 
simultaneously respecting the personal individual and group identities of its numerous 
communities. This capacity for multiple and complementary identities is a key factor for 
successful democratization of multinational states as well as the recognition for the need for 
broad and inclusive citizenship, granting all individuals equal rights.
151
 
Attitudinal  
 Attitudinally, Burma has made the most significant steps in democratization. Even though 
the 2010 elections were not democratic, the military has not attempted to reinstate direct military 
rule by a military junta and has not placed any additional bans on participation. The 
acknowledgement of the outcome of the 2012 by-elections is a clear example that even the 
military party, the USDP, is respecting the new democratic procedures of government. The only 
groups that could be defined as against democracy in Burma are those ethnic groups seeking 
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autonomy. These groups lack connection to the central government, as most have little to no 
citizenship rights and most wish to practice their own form of independent and autonomous 
government. Most ethnic groups are not represented under the current constitution, as they are 
not recognized by the government as citizens. This prohibits them from having a voice in politics 
and hinders any form of open contestation and free and open political participation in Burma. 
Those ethnic groups that are recognized and have been able to form political parties and obtain 
seats face more registration and voting restrictions than participants of Burman background.
152 
Constitutional 
 The 2008 Constitution contains many undemocratic elements, particularly those that 
allow the military to remain in power and that purposefully prevent individuals from holding 
office. The constitution states that the army is fiscally and administratively autonomous and has 
a dual function of providing national defense and maintaining the constitution.
153  
The army is 
also considered to be 'above politics,' in that it has the right as a national institution to 
independently act in order to protect the state’s sovereignty. The Amyotha Hluttaw (the Upper 
House of Nationalities) will consist of 224 seats, 56 of which will be reserved for the military.
154
 
In the Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw (People’s Assembly or Lower House), there will be 330 elected 
members and 110 appointed by the military.
155 
Since 75 percent of the vote will be needed to 
amend the constitution, it will be necessary to have the vote of the military in order to proceed 
with any constitutional amendments.
156 
The constitution also prohibits anyone of foreign 
background, or anyone with a foreign family member from becoming president.
157 
This is seen 
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as a method used by the military to legally keep Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president, as 
she had been married to a British man and her sons hold British citizenship.
158 
The government 
declared that the new 2008 Constitution would go into effect following the first Pyihtaungsu 
Hluttaw meeting after the 2010 elections.
159
 
With the 2008 Constitution still in effect, serious limitations are placed on political and 
civil freedoms in the country. The constitution was ratified after the closure of the National 
Constitutional Convention in 2008 without any input from the NLD. The military rigged the 
constitution to protect its political rights and grant it the capability to establish control over the 
country if the security or sovereignty of the nation should be severely threatened. It also reserves 
25 percent of seats in both houses for the military, making it impossible to obtain the 75 percent 
minimal threshold to amend the constitution without the support of the military. 
Certain  articles  of  the  constitution  which  guarantee  power  to  the  military  and 
commander-in-chief will need to be reformed before the transition can be completed. “Articles 
109(b) and 141(b) give the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services the right to appoint a 
quarter of the members of each house of the parliament.”160 Article 109(b) states that “the Pyithu 
Hluttaw shall be formed with a maximum of 440 Hluttaw representatives” in which no more than 
110 are defense service personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief.
161   Article 141(b) 
states that of the 224 representatives in the Amyotha Hluttaw, 56 will be reserved for defense 
service personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief.
162  Article 201 requires that the 
ministers of Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs be appointed by the president from a list 
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of nominees from the Commander-in-Chief.
163  These articles, among many others, outline the 
extensive control that the military still has in the day-to-day governing of the modern country. 
The judicial branch is currently neither separate nor independent from the executive and 
legislative branches of government and rules by de facto procedures. Judges have been appointed 
or approved by the government and serve until mandatory retirement at the age of 70.
164 Judges, 
especially those in local courts, adjudicate cases on a case by case basis according to their own 
decrees. The de jure system of law is weak in the courts, and corruption is high due in part to the 
low salaries of judges. Whoever pays the judge more can expect to win. The constitution also 
allows individuals to be held without trial or charge for up to five years if the government 
believes they are threatening to the sovereignty or security of the nation.
165 This law has been 
used to justify the detention of thousands of political prisoners during military rule. September 
2012 saw the first steps in a judicial reform process. The new parliament, after the 2012 by- 
elections, forced all nine constitutional tribunal judges to resign from their positions.
166
 
Five Additional Arenas and Conditions 
Civil Society 
 Although Burma is still at the early stages of transition, liberalization efforts have opened 
the doors for democratization and continued progress. Since Thein Sein became president in 
2011, and especially since the 2012 by-elections, Burma has seen relaxations on constraints on 
civil liberties. The establishment of the National Human Rights Commission in Burma has led to 
the amnesty of over 200 political prisoners and instituted new laws that allow unions and strikes 
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for workers. There has been increasing liberalization of the media and internet, and restrictions 
on assembly have been lifted.
167 Restrictions and limitations on education have been eased since 
2011, including the introduction of private education. Restrictions, especially those regarding 
visas for stay in the country, have been eased and lifted for humanitarian organizations and 
NGOs. Activist lawyers have also been returned their licenses and right to practice on a 
piecemeal basis.
168 The suspension of the Myitsone Dam construction
169 
proved to the 
international and domestic community that civil society was flourishing and gaining power. Mass 
protests over the environmental destruction that would be caused by the construction of the dam 
pressured the government to suspend the dam project.
170 
The Myitsone Dam decision 
demonstrates that the government is becoming increasingly responsive to the population and that 
the voices of social movements and groups in the civil society are gaining strength. 
 There have also been several restrictions on the development of civil society in Burma. The 
idea that “Burma is for Burmans” and the “Burmanization” process that occurred during the years 
of military rule have created a very narrow stream of norms and ideals based on an ethnically 
homogenous state. Ethnic groups of other religions, especially the Christian Karen, have been 
suppressed, as well as other ethnic groups and others in support of ethnic pride. 
Political Society 
The 2012 by-elections opened up the political arena by allowing Aung San Suu Kyi and 
the NLD to run and recognizing their success for the first time in history. In the 2012 election, 46 
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of 664 total seats were contested and the NLD won 43 of the 44 seats they contested.
171 
In the 
2010 elections there were also a number of ethnic political parties that won seats, notably the 
Shan Nationals Democratic Party.
172 
Despite these reforms in the electoral process, aspects of the 
2008 Constitution continue to hinder the development of the political society. The fact that Aung 
San Suu Kyi is currently not eligible for the presidency in the 2015 election decreases the freedom 
of political actors being able to compete for power freely in the political arena. Additionally, the 
government postponed by-elections in the Kachin ethnic state due to increased violence between 
the Burmese government and the Kachin Independence Army.
173
 
 The parliamentary session held on August 22, 2011 showed further steps in the right 
direction along the path of democratization. In these sessions, members of parliament had the 
opportunity to speak freely about issues and raise questions to the government. The ministers 
also answered all questions with thorough answers.
174 Following the parliamentary sessions no 
groups that had participated were suppressed. 
Rule of Law 
 Prior to the 2008 Constitution, the military government of Burma had been ruling in 
the absence of any mechanism that would hold the government accountable. Therefore, 
institutions had to be created in an environment where no institutions for democratic 
governance or accountability existed.
175 There was also no legal basis or organized group 
that could legally challenge the junta. From 1988 until the 2008 Constitution, there existed 
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no constitution, no legislature and no legal political parties.
176
 
 The rule of law in Burma is very weak and underdeveloped. According to Transparency 
International, in 2010 the rule of law rating in Burma was -1.5 on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher positive values corresponding to better governance. Significant changes in the rule of law 
and constitution have not occurred since the data was published in 2010. Additionally, 
Transparency International gives Burma a score of 21/100, with 100 being the best, on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks the level of corruption of the public sector. This 
results in Burma ranking 157/177 on this index.
177
 
In Burma, citizens can still be detained without trial, charge or access to a legal 
representative for up to five years.
178 
Additionally, there are special courts for cases regarding 
the military, creating unequal treatment between citizens and the military.
179 
Without separation 
of the judicial branch from the executive branch, rule of law cannot flourish in Burmese society. 
Corruption, especially extra payments to judges, will need to be controlled before a genuine 
Rechtsstaat can exist in Burma. 
State Apparatus 
 Many domestic and international groups have expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of 
the state apparatus. The Myitsone Dam construction project was met by mass protests against 
government plans. This was, however, resolved for the time being in favor of the civil society. 
Furthermore, there is domestic dissatisfaction with the high percentage of military members in 
parliament and with the 2008 Constitution. From an international standpoint, dissatisfaction with 
the actions of the state has been pointed at ethnic conflicts and violent suppression, especially 
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those against the Rohingyan Muslims in the Rakhine state. 
Economic Society 
The economy of Burma remains extremely underdeveloped due to decades of isolation 
from foreign investors and the world market. Most recently, economic growth has begun to 
increase with the opening up of the market, and a relaxation of imposed EU and US sanctions. 
On April 1, 2012 an internationally recognized, official floating exchange rate starting at 818 
kyat to one U.S. dollar
180 
was established and the banking system in the country began to 
grow.
181
 
Conclusion 
The initial stages of Burma's democratization have included many successful measures 
that have opened up the country to many liberal reforms, particularly within the civil, political 
and economic societies. At the same time, efforts made thus far to democratize have also 
reinforced military rule, hindering progression and completion of a successful democracy. The 
drafting and passing of the 2008 Constitution and the elections in 2010 were important liberal 
strides towards democratization, even if they fell short of initiating a democratic transition. The 
2012 by-elections, even though only 46 out of 664 seats in the national parliament were 
contested, are the first true instance of free and fair, internationally observed elections, therefore 
initiating transition. 
The two main hindrances to democratization in Burma are the ethnic problem and the 
2008 Constitution. Because of Burma's history, the ethnic groups living in the periphery of 
Burma feel no connection with the central government of Burma and wish to autonomously 
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establish and maintain their ethnic states. Many of these ethnic groups are denied citizenship by 
the government, making it impossible for them to claim the right to their land or have a political 
voice in the new government. Addressing this issue through the implementation of an 
Indonesian style federal system is likely the most promising answer to unifying the country. The 
second major barrier to democratization is the current constitution. The 2008 Constitution was 
clearly written by the military and used by the military to legitimate and legalize its authority. 
Until revisions are made, the military will have the deciding voice in parliament, with a twenty-
five percent guaranteed vote, and has the option to legally take over the country again if it feels 
the security of the state is threatened. Revisions to the constitution, similar to those that took 
place between the 1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia, which eliminated all reserved seats in 
parliament for military appointees,
182 
will be necessary before democracy can flourish. 
 
PART THREE: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF THE BURMESE 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
Introduction 
 
In Part II, I have explained the dependent variable, democratization, and established that 
Burma is still in the very early stages of transition. Using the framework for democratic 
transition and consolidation developed by Linz and Stepan, I have shown that Burma began a 
transition with the by-election of 2012 and explained the aspects of Burmese society that hinder 
transition completion and progress into consolidation. I have argued what needs to change in 
order for democratization to flourish within Burma. The next section, Part III, develops a theory 
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for why Burma democratized when it did, introducing the independent variables in my 
hypothesis. The groundwork established in Part II is important to this next section because it 
outlines the continued military presence in the new democracy, and the fragile relationship 
between the new political society, civil society and the military. This framework will help 
understand the tension between the Burmese government's need for the international recognition 
and legitimacy of the country on the one hand, and its desire to maintain its sovereignty on the 
other. 
 The major question to be addressed in this section is why did Burma democratize when it 
did? My hypothesis is that Burma needed the international legitimacy and recognition of the 
international community in order to survive in a globalizing world, and the regime saw an 
opportunity to obtain this by chairing ASEAN in 2014. I begin part III by arguing that Burma 
can be considered a part of Huntington’s Third Wave of democratization, and introduce 
Huntington's five independent variables that he argues cause Third Wave transitions. The five 
independent variables, which will be introduced in detail later in this section, all pertain to the 
rise of the importance of international law and institutions in international order. Following 
World War II, institutions became vital to international order, in order to prevent another large 
scale war. Sovereignty is traditionally considered one of the most legitimized institutions in the 
international arena. Following the war, international law gained strength and legitimacy as an 
institution.
183 
The dominance of Western democracy at the end of the Cold War expedited the global 
trend towards universal democracy and human rights standards, as established by the Western 
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European and Northern American actors.
184 
As democracy and human security became 
legitimized concepts in the international arena, particularly through the use of international 
institutions driven by these Western actors, the institutions of sovereignty and international law 
began to change. International law justified the new global standard as being one where 
democracy and individual freedoms were the “only game in town.”185 Sovereignty became 
layered and distributed, changing the idea of what it meant to be a “state” in the international 
arena. Westphalian sovereignty, traditionally viewed as the “only game in town”, since it 
establishes the definition of a state, has now become a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient to 
becoming a legitimized state actor. In Part III, I will introduce four aspects of state sovereignty 
developed by Stephen Krasner: Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, interdependence 
sovereignty and international legal sovereignty.
186 
I argue that the concept of state sovereignty is 
becoming conditional to liberal norms and standards set by institutions and powerful, 
democratic states. Once international legal sovereignty, or the mutual recognition of state 
sovereignty, has been established, normally through admittance into the United Nations, state 
recognition, or legitimacy, becomes conditional to the changing rules of the game. 
Throughout Part III, I will defend my hypothesis that it is the desire for international 
legitimacy and recognition as a credible sovereign state that is driving Burmese and ASEAN 
actors. As institutions became the driving actors of international order, they established a form of 
sovereignty, moving the concept of sovereignty from pertaining only to states to a concept 
pertaining to a variety of actors. Ian Hurd argues that “sovereignty exists wherever processes of 
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legitimation create powerful institutions of authority in world politics.”187 The authority that 
institutions exercise provides evidence that sovereignty does not only pertain to the state, and that 
the sovereign state is not the ultimate unit of the international system.
188
 I argue that ASEAN was 
created to protect Westphalian sovereignty while also establishing international legal sovereignty 
among member states, and among member states and other international actors. ASEAN, like 
many other international organizations, also obtained a form of sovereignty based on mutual 
recognition, as other actors held it accountable for the actions of its member states and it became 
expected to influence actions and decisions of member states. ASEAN differed from other 
international organizations in that its principal state actors maintained a strong belief in its 
traditional policy, known as the “ASEAN Way”, which stressed the importance in the affairs of 
members of non-intervention and consensus among all members on any significant issue. I argue 
that Burma joined ASEAN as a means to strengthen and legitimate its international legal 
sovereignty, or recognition as a legitimate state actor. Burma officially received the right to this 
sovereignty in 1948 when it joined the United Nations; however, it feels its sovereignty threatened 
by the global liberal changes of many powerful UN member states. It desired this form of 
sovereignty that the other Southeast Asian states had obtained through membership in ASEAN. 
Burma would quickly learn that joining the web of international institutions would mean 
conforming to the global trend of political liberalization in order to maintain recognition and 
credibility. 
 Admitting Burma created a legitimacy crisis for ASEAN and the other member states of 
ASEAN, since they depended on ASEAN to strengthen and enhance their recognition as 
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individual states and as a region in the international arena. The European Union and the United 
States criticized ASEAN and pressured ASEAN as an organization to manage the affairs of 
Burma. In this part of my thesis I will show, using a timeline of events starting with Burma's 
admittance to the organization in 1997, how ASEAN was used as an agent by external actors, 
namely the European Union and the United States, as well as the individual member states to 
promote democratization in Burma. I will show how the use of ASEAN was necessary to bring 
about change in Burma, compared to unilateral or bilateral efforts by the individual actors. 
In the last part of Part III, I will explain the importance of the ASEAN Chair in the timing 
of democratization. I will argue that the request to chair the organization in 2014, two years 
before its scheduled turn, was Burma's way of proving to the international community its 
credibility as an international actor. Chairing the organization was crucial for Burma in obtaining 
the legitimacy needed to become a competitive state actor. Obtaining the chair prior to its 
scheduled year would prove Burma's worthiness to the international community, showing that 
Burma was viewed as a legitimate actor by ASEAN, being allowed to administer discussions and 
events on ASEAN's behalf. Part III will demonstrate that Burma democratized as a need for 
international recognition, and believed this to be obtainable through chairing the organization. 
Burma: A Third Wave Transition Country? 
 
 Samuel Huntington’s theory of democratization describes three major waves. He argues 
there are also two reverse waves, subsequent to the first two waves of democratization. The first 
wave occurred from 1828 to 1926 with the emergence of democratic institutions.
189 
The first 
reverse wave followed from 1922 to 1942 with the rise of communist, fascist and militaristic 
ideologies. The second wave of democratization occurred from 1943 to 1962 and had its roots in 
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World War II and the promotion of democratic values and institutions by the allied forces.
190 
The 
second reverse wave lasted from 1958 to 1975 and was driven by distrust towards the pertinence 
of democracy in developing countries and functionality of democracy in already democratic 
nations. Democracy was suppressed mainly through military coups or the implementation of 
martial law.
191
 
The third wave of democratization began in 1974, and is arguably still in effect. The 
majority of third wave democratizations occurred in the 1970s and 1980s with southern Europe 
and Latin America undergoing democratic transitions, and the end of the Cold War.
192  
Indonesia 
began democratic transition in 1997 and is still considered to be part of the third wave. I argue 
that Burma is also part of the third wave of democratization, despite being significantly later than 
other third wave democratizers. Although more than a decade apart from one another, both 
Indonesia and Burma began democratic transitions very late in the third wave. The Cold War 
atmosphere in Southeast Asia only strengthened authoritarian regimes, as the newly independent 
countries felt their national sovereignty threatened by the two competing powers. For this reason, 
military regimes in both Indonesia and Burma prospered during the Cold War period. Despite 
both being run by the military, the foreign policies and international efforts of the two countries 
differed greatly. Indonesia, as a founding member of ASEAN, was active in strengthening 
regional cooperation and security in order to unite Southeast Asia against external powers, 
particularly the Cold War rivals. Burma, on the other hand, adopted an isolationist foreign policy, 
shielding itself from regional and other external powers. Burma's isolation may have been an 
important factor in its later democratization in comparison to Indonesia. 
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In Huntington’s study, democratization is the dependent variable.193 There are many 
independent variables that have the ability to contribute to change in the dependent variable. The 
study is complex, in that the independent variables change from time to time and differ 
significantly between different places and situations. Democratization cannot be explained by one 
factor, and is therefore always a combination of factors. The same set of independent variables 
can also not be used to explain a wave, as cases within the wave vary greatly.
194 
That being said, 
Huntington argues that there are five significant changes to plausible independent variables that 
play significant roles in bringing about third wave transitions. They are the deepening legitimacy 
problems of authoritarian systems, the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, 
changes in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, changes in the policies of external actors, and 
demonstration effects fostered by the globalization of communication and transportation.
195
 
 I view all of these factors as related to the rise of international law and institutions as a 
form of international order. They have fostered a general international shift towards 
multilateral action and interdependency through institutions. With regards to Burma, no 
changes of the five listed plausibly connects to the country’s initiation of democratization. I 
argue instead that the late democratization of Burma in the third wave was brought about by a 
combination of changes in the policies of external actors and growing legitimacy problems for 
both the regime and ASEAN. The regime in Burma realized the difficulties of surviving in a 
world where democracy and human rights were becoming legitimate norms of international 
law and where national sovereignty was losing its traditional meaning. The timing of Burma’s 
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democratization can be explained by Burma’s desperate desire to chair ASEAN, as a 
mechanism towards becoming a recognized, legitimate international actor.  
The process began with changes in the policies of external actors, particularly the rising 
acceptance of universal freedoms and human rights. ASEAN, founded in 1967,
196 
was created at 
a time when international values regarding universal democracy and human rights were 
beginning to take precedence in the foreign policy agendas of major Western actors. These values 
were not yet deeply institutionalized in the policies of major Western-led international 
organizations. Overtime, as Western values of democracy and human rights became legitimized, 
countries within ASEAN and the Southeast Asian region began to democratize and accept, to 
some extent, these new ideals. These policies became deeply embedded in international law and 
international institutions, such as the EU and UN, which began to legitimize these policies as 
international norms and standards. ASEAN, a weak international institution became threatened 
by the stronger, more democratic institutions; particularly as an increasing number of Southeast 
Asian countries became more liberal and democratic. As the number of democracies increased in 
the world, democracy developed in Southeast Asia, particularly within Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Thailand. As an institution ASEAN became vulnerable to the growing dependency and 
importance that international institutions, particularly regional organizations had on the internal 
affairs of its member states. 
 The changes in the policies of external actors towards liberal universal values, contributed 
to a legitimacy problem as a cause in the democratization of Burma. The spread of democracy in 
Asia and the growth of the international communication and transportation system caused the 
ideas of democracy and human rights to reach the population of Burma and continuously decrease 
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the legitimacy of the military regime. The growing interest in the idea of universal democracy and 
human rights from Western powers also created a deepening legitimacy problem for ASEAN with 
regards to Burma. Although ASEAN traditionally favors a policy of non-intervention and quiet 
diplomacy, the declining legitimacy and credibility that the organization suffered from the 
situation in Burma, caused ASEAN to readjust its policies on Burma. Additionally, as more 
countries within Southeast Asia democratized or liberalized, and as the international arena became 
increasingly dependent on institutions for maintaining global order, ASEAN as a whole became 
more liberal and active in the fight against human rights violations. In this thesis, I will first show 
how Huntington’s five changes played an important role in the democratization of Burma, as well 
as why others did not. I will then argue how these factors caused ASEAN, as an institution, to be 
used by several different actors to push democratization in Burma, and why the use of the 
institution was necessary over unilateral or bilateral policies. 
Huntington's Five Significant Changes 
 
1. Deep Legitimacy Problems of Authoritarian Systems 
 
“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms 
strength into right and obedience into duty (Rousseau).”197 Principles of enlightenment, literacy 
and globalization, particularly in the spread of ideas, have changed the way in which people view 
the legitimacy of their regimes. Although the military regime in Burma was able to suppress each 
opposition movement with violence, the problem of legitimacy and performance became one of 
the factors leading to democratization in Burma. 
 Huntington names five ways that authoritarian governments responded to their declining 
legitimacy. Many leaders refused to acknowledge the weakness of their leadership or regime and 
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hoped that they would simply continue to survive. Second, they used brute force to install coerced 
obedience, as seen with Burma's suppression of protests. Third, regimes attempted to build 
attention towards a new foreign conflict and re-legitimize themselves through a sense of strong 
nationalism. Fourth, the authoritarian governments used democratic mechanisms to relegitimize 
their authoritarian rule. Most used elections, confident that they would obtain the majority and be 
able to remain in power.
198 
Burma attempted once to relegitimize its military government through 
elections. The elections held in 1990 resulted in a loss for the military government and its 
party.
199 
Faced with the reality that the elections had not reinforced their rule, the government 
simply refused to acknowledge the election results and continued to remain in power. Fifth, the 
regime itself could introduce a democratic system. This normally occurs after a change in 
leadership in the authoritarian regime.
200 
The rise of Thein Sein in the 2010 elections can be seen 
as a democratic action taken by the regime itself. The beginning of the democratic transition 
process in 2012 was then brought about by a change in leadership. Thein Sein was part of the 
military regime, but has proven to be a soft-liner and reformist in his years of presidency thus far. 
In the case of Burma we see methods four and five at work. The legitimization of 
international norms of democracy caused the Burmese government to realize that democratic 
reform was the key to its own legitimacy. Like most authoritarian governments that willingly 
undergo democratic transition, the Burmese government believed that a top-down approach to 
installing democracy would allow it to maintain control over the country, while presenting the 
outside world with a democratic facade. However, the legitimacy crisis of the regime alone 
cannot explain the democratization of Burma, as it is not evident by this one example where 
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the legitimacy crisis comes from and what brought about sudden change after decades of 
military rule. 
2. Unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s 
 
Huntington argues that the unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which 
raised living standards, increased education and expanded the urban middle-class, was one cause 
of third wave transitions.
201 
He argues that economic crises weakened or destabilized regimes, 
strengthening would-be democrats. He also argues that rapid economic growth in countries 
naturally facilitated democratic transitions. This economic development he argues, promotes the 
expansion of the middle class, who become the biggest supporters of democratization.
202
 
 The strength of the military and the isolationist foreign policy stance of the Burmese 
government hindered economic growth, or the rise of an educated, urban middle class from being 
the leading forces behind democratization. Following the coup in 1962, Ne Win chose to isolate 
Burma from the outside world, rather than engage with it, for fear of losing its newly gained 
independence.
203 
While other countries allowed their economies to flourish, Burma’s economy 
continued to disintegrate. Protests against the military dictator, U Ne Win, and his socialist 
government, the BSPP, did occur regularly in the aftermath of significant economic downturns. 
Each time the military was strong enough to suppress the opposition, blocking any attempts for 
democracy to flourish. 
 Leading into the protests in August 1988, Burma had received the status of ‘Least 
Developed Country’ from the UN, and the government had withdrawn the new currency notes, 
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raised student tuition rates, and forced farmers to sell below market price.
204 
The protests of 
1988 did not, however, lead to democracy. Instead they brought a military junta to power, 
which would remain in power until 2010.  In 2007, the Saffron Rebellion protests were also 
economically driven. The removal of fuel subsidies caused gas prices to spike overnight. These 
protests proved also to be unsuccessful in bringing about a democratic transition in Burma, as 
they were brutally shut down by the military government. The fact that Burma was able to 
avoid significant economic growth and democratization well into the 21st century, leads us to 
believe that the global economic growth of the 1960s was irrelevant to the democratization of 
Burma. 
3. Changes in the doctrine of the Catholic Church 
 
 Huntington’s argument that the spread of Christianity, especially the changes in the 
Catholic doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s that involved the Church further in social and political 
affairs, brought about a number of Third Wave democratic transitions. There are three major 
reasons why the spread of Christianity and the change in the Catholic doctrine are irrelevant, in 
my opinion, to the democratization of Burma. First, unlike their Spanish and Portuguese 
neighbors, the British were not concerned with missionary work in their colonization efforts, and 
as a predominantly Protestant country, the involvement of the Catholic church in the society was 
of little concern or interest to them. Second, Burma historically has strong ties between the 
Buddhist religion and the political societies. Buddhism has played a major role in shaping the 
political and civil society throughout most of modern day Burma. Burmese kings have 
historically been considered to be ‘semi-divine’ rulers. As most Burmans were Buddhist, 
Buddhism as a national religion became a driving unifying factor behind the nationalistic 
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movement for independence.
205 
Third, democratic transitions brought about through the spread of 
Christianity or the new doctrine of the Catholic Church had died out by about 1990.
206
 
4. Changes in policies of external actors 
 
 The Third Wave of democratization began around the same time as the ideas of democracy 
and human rights began to become institutionalized as international norms. Following the Cold 
War, more countries began to view the use of institutions and multilateral actions as more 
legitimate than unilateral or bilateral efforts.
207 
This was due to the growing concern about 
maintaining international order and cooperation. In order to avoid another war between major 
powers, a need for order, accountability and information was prevalent among states. 
International law became stronger as institutions became more powerful bodies. The 
legitimization of democracy and human rights through the strengthening of international 
institutions, in combination with the desire of states to be a part of the institutions, caused a 
decreasing legitimacy of Westphalian sovereignty. International Relations scholar, Stephen D. 
Krasner, identifies 4 types of sovereignty, which will be discussed in detail later.
208 
Of Krasner's 
four types of sovereignty, legal sovereignty and domestic sovereignty were beginning to trump 
Westphalian sovereignty, as sovereignty became layered and distributed among international 
institutions. Sovereignty can historically always be described as a product of legitimacy and 
recognition. However, with the growing trend towards a liberal world and the further distribution 
of sovereignty away from states, state sovereignty becomes increasingly more conditional. 
Measures of conditionality are set and judged by primarily Western, liberal, democratic states.  
 Europe and the United States took the lead in trying to implement and spread the idea of 
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universal democracy and human rights. At the start of the Third Wave, the European Union 
initiated action through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was 
concluded with the Helsinki Final Act, and the Helsinki Process. All three produced documents 
regarding the international legitimization of human rights and basic freedoms, as well as the 
permission for international monitoring of human rights.
209
 
 The European Union, as a strong regional institution, became a major dialogue and 
trade partner for ASEAN, as ASEAN developed into a regional organization. Eventually, as 
democracy became legitimized as a norm of the European Union, ASEAN became subject to 
Europe’s ideals on international human rights and democracy. The European Union, as an 
external organization, began to place significant pressure on ASEAN with regards to Burma, 
following Burma’s admittance to the organization in 1997. 
 The United States was the other major Western actor that involved itself in the spread of 
international human rights and universal democracy. In the 1970s, the United States Congress 
added human rights amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the Mutual Assistance Act, the 
Trade Reform Act, and the International Financial Institutions Act. All of these new amendments 
emphasized that countries guilty of violating basic human rights would not be given 
assistance.
210
 The Carter and Reagan administrations focused on individual human rights and 
suspended economic assistance to several countries violating the terms of basic human rights. 
The Reagan administration originally emphasized the need to counter communist regimes but 
eventually moved to promoting democratic change in other authoritarian governments as well.
211 
Similar to the EU, the US began to not only directly pressure Burma to abide by the ideas of 
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democracy and universal human rights, but also ASEAN to foster democracy in Burma, as a 
member of the organization. 
5. Snowballing or demonstration effects 
Snowballing can be considered the domino effect of democratization. Democratic change 
is encouraged in other countries through examples of successful democratizations elsewhere.
212
 
There are three main influences that could lead to a snowballing democratization effect. The first 
is that a country may decide it is facing similar problems experienced by the newly democratized 
country, prior to successful democratization. Second, governments with problems may turn to 
democratization as a solution because they have seen how democracy can successfully solve 
problems in other nations. Thirdly, a country may choose to undergo democratic change because 
of the status of the recently democratized country, which has become their model.
213
 
Of the three waves, the snowballing effect was most prevalent in the Third Wave. 
Globalization elements, particularly global communication and transportation fostered the spread 
of information regarding political demonstrations, and successful stories of democratization 
elsewhere.
214 
It became increasingly difficult and costly for authoritarian governments to 
completely control media sources within their countries, therefore preventing them from shielding 
their citizens from new international events. Snowballing effects were still the strongest between 
countries within the same region or sphere of cultural values.
215 
Although the snowballing effect 
did not bring about democratic change in Burma, the ideas of democracy and individual freedoms 
were certainly driving factors in some of the mass demonstrations Burma faced prior to 2010. 
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ASEAN, the reason behind Burma’s democratization?  
The Legitimacy Problem and the rise of Institutionalism  
 
Jon C. Pevehouse and other notable scholars argue that international and especially 
regional organizations can foster international support for democracy within their geographical 
sphere of influence. For Pevehouse, a regional organization is a formal institution whose 
membership is limited by geographical boundaries.
216 
The capabilities and also the limitations of 
international and regional organizations, in terms of influence, create an ideal model for analyzing 
how outside pressure can influence a democratic transition on another regime or population. 
 Before democratization began, the US and EU both showed little investment interest in 
Burma, as they did not have strong historical ties with the country nor did they see much 
economic benefit in the country. More concerned with communist China and a nuclear North 
Korea, the United States and European Union were not as directly involved in the affairs of 
Burma. The United States and the European Union were, however, successful in placing enough 
pressure on ASEAN to create a legitimacy concern for the organization. As ASEAN became 
more susceptible to global changes regarding institutions and international law, Burma, as a 
member, began to realize the need to conform to a changing ASEAN and changing world, in 
order to be viewed as a legitimate actor. Three concepts will be addressed before analyzing the 
Burmese case study: why institutions became important, the changing nature of sovereignty, and 
how these ideas became legitimized on a global scale. 
Institutions 
Both world wars in the 1900s demonstrated that states were becoming more 
                                                          
216
 Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy from above: Regional organizations and democratization, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.  
64 
 
interdependent, and that globalization was helping to facilitate the movement of people, 
technology and ideas at rapid speed. Wars became bigger, deadlier and more international in this 
sense. Following World War II there was a growing consensus to establish some form of 
cooperation and order among states in order to prevent another large scale international war. 
Institutions, particularly international law, became the basis for this international cooperation and 
order.
217 
Institutions provide the space for information to be exchanged, decrease uncertainty and 
therefore enhance trust among states. Institutions also increase interdependency among states in 
economic and political matters, fostering credible commitments between actors, solving collective 
decision-making problems and facilitating reciprocity.
218 
 Both stronger and weaker actors have advantages in using international institutions. In a 
world where institutions are becoming the building blocks of international order, 'not belonging' 
is stigmatized as wanting to go against the global norms and expectations. Belonging to an 
institution provides the state with the ‘in-group’ identity that fosters recognition, needed to survive in a 
world of power inequalities. States and institutions wishing to maintain their recognition on an 
international level must conform to the global trend or risk being stigmatized, or pressured to 
develop up to par. For weaker states, institutions provide a space of increased bargaining power 
and political voice.
219
 Through institutions, weaker states come under a protective umbrella of 
more powerful states, as long as they abide by the norms and values set by those powerful states 
in the system. Additionally, as institutions are representative of a larger audience, they are able 
to impose constraints on the intentions of larger states, offering potential protection against 
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aggressive, powerful states.
220 
Weaker states therefore gain access to more security, sovereignty, 
and information regarding others intentions. 
 Stronger states can use institutions to legitimize their ideals and values as internationally 
accepted norms, as well as to justify different mechanisms of intervention, from diplomatic to 
military. Intervention approved through an institution legitimates the action, by generating greater 
international support.
221 
Unilateral action is deemed more costly than multilateral action, and 
therefore multilateral action, particularly through institutions, is becoming the normative choice 
for states.
222 
Institutions have a higher degree of neutrality and autonomy than states because they 
are representatives of a larger community.
223 
Therefore, institutions are arguable agents of its 
members and serve as information carriers. Claims made unilaterally by a single actor lack 
neutrality, whereas actions endorsed through an institution become multilateral actions and are 
rendered believable and defensible,
224 
as they are said to be within the boundaries of international 
law. 
 Sovereignty is considered to be the strongest international institution since the Treaty of 
Westphalia, which established sovereignty as the exclusive right of a state to control everything 
within its territory.
225 
Membership in an institution is supposed to be voluntary, as it is the 
state's right whether to voluntarily enter into an agreement with another state.
226 
However, as 
international law becomes more legitimized as an institution itself, and in the basis of other 
institutions and organizations, and the concern for human security becomes a global trend, non- 
members are pressured into either accepting the conditions of an institution or become 
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involuntarily subject to the framework.
227 
Legitimacy in institutions is transcending the idea of 
voluntary compliance in international order, changing the notion of sovereignty for state actors. 
Both ASEAN and Burma felt the need to involuntarily comply with the growing concerns for 
international law and human security. ASEAN, as an organization felt pressured by outside 
actors to adopt a stronger legal framework to hold member states more accountable to the 
organization, which was becoming more accountable to larger democratic, liberal actors. The 
concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy will be discussed below. 
Sovereignty 
Stephen D. Krasner defines four different types of sovereignty. The first type, 
Westphalian sovereignty, arose out of the Treaty of Westphalia that created an international 
system of independent, sovereign states. A state can be said to have Westphalian sovereignty if it 
is not subject to intervention by another state. The state has the right to the monopoly of control 
within its borders.
228 
As most state boundaries were drawn following the end of the period of 
colonial empires and the fall of the Soviet Union, this was the type of state sovereignty that most 
newly independent states desired. 
 The other three types of sovereignty all imply that the state is held accountable to 
something else, implying that there is some powerful force manipulating the international arena. 
These three sovereignties are interdependence sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and legal 
sovereignty. Interdependence sovereignty refers to a state's ability to control the movement 
across its borders. This includes ideas, people, goods or capital.
229 
This illustrates how much 
control a state or government has over its boundaries in comparison to other states in a 
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globalizing world. Unless the state is able to maintain strong control over the influx of ideas and 
goods entering and exiting its boundaries, the state is vulnerable to the new ideas, cultures and 
goods originating from a more powerful, legitimate state. 
The third type of sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, is the ability of the state authority to 
govern and regulate behavior within its boundaries.
230 
In domestic sovereignty, the authority 
structure is accountable to the demos it is trying to control. The ability in which it can exercise 
control over the demos relies heavily on how much the demos accepts and recognizes the 
authority. The more legitimate an authority is viewed, the more control it will be able to exercise. 
The less legitimate an authority is viewed, the more difficult it will be to exercise control over the 
demos without the use of brute force. Domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty are 
intertwined, in that a decrease in domestic sovereignty can result in a decrease in interdependence 
sovereignty and vice-versa.
231 
The more limited control a government has over its people, the 
more difficult it will be to control who and what is transiting its borders. 
The last type of sovereignty, and arguably the most important form of state sovereignty 
today is international legal sovereignty. A state is said to have international legal sovereignty if 
it is recognized by other states. This implies that sovereignty is dependent on mutual 
recognition. Mutual recognition recognizes states as equals in the international system and 
grants the state exclusive juridical authority over its society.
232 
Legal sovereignty therefore is 
accountable to the most powerful, legitimate actors and ideas in the system. In this sense, legal 
sovereignty becomes susceptible to the changing ideas of order in the international system. 
Traditionally, a state is considered to have international legal sovereignty if it has been admitted 
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to the United Nations. Once admitted and recognized as a sovereign state by the definitions of 
international legal sovereignty, a state does not necessarily lose its international legal sovereignty 
even if it becomes a rogue or aggressive state. However, if a state does not adopt and follow the 
global trends of accepted behavior, the international legal sovereignty of the state will become 
threatened by those leading the trends. The growing legitimacy of the UN as the world institution of 
states has given it the power to define who is a sovereign state and what the conditions of sovereignty 
are.  As institutions become more like legal bodies, representative of larger bodies of actors and 
embodying certain norms and expectations, institutions are also gaining the right to sovereignty. 
For many smaller institutions, such as ASEAN, recognition as a legitimate institution by other 
institutions is necessary to survive in a world where institutions are gaining sovereignty. It is this 
type of sovereignty, and the legitimacy needed for this type of sovereignty, that threatens both 
ASEAN, as an institution, and Burma, as a state. 
 Krasner's four types of sovereignty pertain to the sovereignty of the state. State sovereignty 
is what is commonly thought of when sovereignty is mentioned. Post World War II, and 
particularly post-Cold War, is a time when warfare moved from interstate conflict to intrastate 
conflict. Additionally, a rising concern for NTS (nontraditional security threats), such as terrorism 
and natural disasters, and the use of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) has allowed for a new 
type of sovereignty to take center stage: individual sovereignty or human security.
233 
As 
democratic values and ideas of universal human rights became embedded in international 
institutions, such as the United Nations and the European Union, the world began to move from a 
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state-centered to a people-centered world,
234 
as institutions became, in some aspects, more 
legitimate than the individual states themselves. UN Secretary General in 1992, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, said, “Respect for a [state's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity is crucial to any 
international progress... [But] the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ...has passed (Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali).”235 
 The United Nations, the most representative institution of the international arena, has 
been the driving force behind the legitimization of human security and individual sovereignty. 
The term “human security” was coined by the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) 
and refers to “the freedom from fear and want,” stressing the importance of the well-being of 
individuals.
236 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's report in 
2001, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), further stressed the importance of individual 
sovereignty, displaying the increasing global trend towards a world where universal human 
rights and freedoms are respected. It emphasizes the power and legitimacy of international 
institutions in that it grants the right of the international community, through institutions, to 
intervene in another sovereign state if the state does not take responsibility for the well-being of 
its citizens.
237  
This idea holds states accountable to norms of human rights in the international 
system. Individual states are pressured by the international community to protect their citizens, 
and elites become accountable to institutions capable of intervening, should they not uphold 
their responsibility to protect the demos.
238 
This implies a global shift from a traditional 
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international norm of non-intervention, to a norm of intervention when certain norms regarding 
human rights are not upheld. 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy, as defined by Mark Suchman (1995), is a “generalized 
perception/assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, and appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, definitions.”239 It is the socially 
recognized right to rule or control. If a rule or institution in the international arena is considered 
to be legitimate, a majority of states believe that it ought to be obeyed. Legitimacy implies that 
states act according to 'logic of appropriateness' and not according to a rational cost-benefit 
analysis.
240 
Actors are following legitimized norms and procedures on the basis that it is what 
they should be doing, and not because it is the best option in the given situation. 
Legitimacy is not coercion or self-interest; however, in many cases a legitimized idea or 
action began as relations of coercion and self-interest.
241 
Coercion gets an actor to involuntarily 
comply through the motivation of fear or punishment. A decision made through self-interest is 
made after undergoing a cost-benefit analysis of complying vs. not complying. An institution can 
invoke compliance as self-interest of its members by making the consequences of not complying 
undesirable.
242 
Legitimacy requires that there are two or more actors that mutually acknowledge and 
comply with a norm. Before an idea can be legitimized, it must first exist and then be internalized 
by the individual actors. At first, an actor may be forced to comply with the idea through the 
coercer, or by rationally evaluating the outcome of not complying. Overtime, the idea becomes 
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internalized until finally the actor complies with the legitimized norm out of habit, instead of out 
of need or interest. As the number of actors that have legitimized the norm increase, the more 
legitimate the rule becomes on a global scale. It is when an idea becomes legitimized at the 
international level that nonbelievers can no longer ignore the rule if they don't agree with it.
243 
Nonbelievers become stigmatized against the international norm, as there is enough support for 
the norm to create a right vs. wrong. Burma is a classic example of a country that became 
stigmatized by the international norms of democracy and human rights as those norms became 
increasingly legitimized. The more legitimate these norms became, particularly within member 
countries of ASEAN, the more difficult it became to ignore and counter the norm. Eventually, out 
of both coercion and self-interest Burma was forced to comply with the legitimate norms of the 
“in-group.” 
The concepts of institutions and sovereignty within international relations, and how they 
become legitimized are important to the discussion of democratization in Burma. The next part 
of this thesis will describe how these concepts played vital roles in making ASEAN, as an 
institution, more accountable to international norms and standards of other international 
institutions and actors. I will then show how Burma's democratization was a combination of 
coercion and self-interest. Coercers used ASEAN as an institution to pressure Burma to comply 
with norms of democracy and human rights. In line with this, Burma also acted out of self- 
interest, the need for international legal sovereignty that it felt it could gain through chairing 
ASEAN, in order to become a recognized credible state. To prove my thesis, I will start with the 
creation of ASEAN and work my way up to Burma's start as the 2014 ASEAN chair. 
ASEAN 
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 ASEAN was created in the signing of the Bangkok Declaration on August 8, 1967 by the 
foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Established in 
the midst of the Cold War, the objective of ASEAN was to foster regional cooperation and create 
a security buffer from the Cold War rivals in the region.
244 
Adam Malik stated, “ASEAN can be 
seen as reflecting the growing political will of the nations of this region to take charge of their 
own future, to work out problems of their development, stability and security together and to 
prevent their region from continuing to remain the arena and subject of major power rivalry and 
then conflict.”245 
 Security and economic cooperation were the main reasons for the formation of the 
organization. The countries of Southeast Asia are extremely diverse in political, economic, social 
and cultural matters, making it harder for ASEAN to develop as a homogenous regional 
organization. These diverse backgrounds and beliefs in political systems, cultural norms and 
ideologies hindered the region from becoming a strong political institution. Initially, it was 
publicly stated that ASEAN was to be primarily an economic organization, concerned with 
fostering trade liberalization and economic growth within the region.
246 
However, it is obvious 
that security was a significant factor in the groundwork of the organization, as the sovereignty of 
the newly independent states threatened to fall victim again to world powers during the Cold 
War. In terms of security, member states, especially the smaller and weaker states of Southeast 
Asia, believed that the organization would provide a sense of security and strength in the 
international arena.
247
 
 With the exception of Thailand, all of the countries belonging to ASEAN suffered from 
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great power intervention and colonization until the middle of the 20
th
 century. This common 
historical background and the fear that arose out of this time period were important in developing 
the basic conditions and agreements for security measures under ASEAN.
248  
The memories of 
colonization created a strong sense of respect for Westphalian sovereignty among the nations of 
the organization. At the time most Southeast Asian countries gained independence, Westphalian 
sovereignty, or the exclusive right of the state to rule everything within its boundaries, was the 
strongest form of sovereignty sought by states. In 1967, the only type of sovereignty that the 
founding members of ASEAN had in common was Westphalian sovereignty. The newly 
independent states struggled with claiming domestic and interdependence sovereignty, because 
they were still adjusting to the idea of an independent, sovereign state and how to effectively 
govern their people while protecting their borders. ASEAN, in a sense, was created out of a need 
to strengthen the international legal sovereignty of member states between one another on a 
regional level.
249
 By cooperating through a regional organization, members were able to 
recognize each other’s right to exist and respect the territories of fellow members. This need for 
the protection of Westphalian sovereignty, in combination with the need to establish mutual 
recognition among member states and more powerful international actors, was vital to the 
diplomatic structure of ASEAN, known as the “ASEAN Way.”250 
 ASEAN adopted many of its basic principles from the United Nations Charter, which is 
also generally viewed as the basis of international law. The four elements of “ASEAN way” 
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diplomacy include: principles of non-interference in internal affairs, the principle of quiet 
diplomacy, the  non-use  of  force,  but  peaceful  settlement of  disputes, and  the  principle of 
decision making through consensus.
251 
The founding nations of ASEAN argued that interference 
in the domestic affairs of member states would only impede the necessary nation-building 
processes they believed were most important to the newly independent states. The right to rule its 
territory and the recognition of the right to the territory were aspects that the newly independent 
states of Southeast Asia strived for after a past of great power intervention. The principle of quiet 
diplomacy means that members will resist and refrain from openly criticizing other member 
states in public. This idea is based on the belief that nations need to experience a high level of 
comfort and trust in the regional organization in order for the organization to obtain the unity and 
cooperative security it needs in the international arena. The principle of non-use of force was 
also adopted in order to foster trust and comfort among member states. The last principle, the 
principle of decision making through consensus, requires that states come to a completely agreed 
upon settlement and that decisions would not be imposed on members through a ‘majority-rules’ 
voting process.
252 
To this extent, the organization is only as strong as its weakest member, 
because consensus agreements entail that state's votes and opinions are regarded equally and that 
states may not override an idea not accepted by a member state.
253
 
 It is generally accepted that the more homogeneously democratic the membership of a 
regional organization, the higher the possibility that it will have the power and capability to 
pressure and influence authoritarian and autocratic governments to democratize and also enforce 
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the stated conditions for liberalization and assist with consolidation.
254 
This is the central issue 
ASEAN faces in regards to constant pressure from the United States and the European Union, as 
well as the more democratic members of Southeast Asia. The member states of ASEAN are 
composed of a diverse assortment of political systems and ideologies which lack the high degree 
of shared interests needed to create a homogeneously democratic organization.
255 
This results in 
the near impossibility of coming to agreements on how to deal with the internal political 
structures of member states,
256 
which is why the non-interference principle is so important. 
ASEAN is composed of authoritarian governments, communist governments, countries 
undergoing political reform and change and a variety of “democracies.” Not all countries in the 
region are full democracies according to international standards. Of all of the member states in 
the organization, only Indonesia has been given a rating of “Free” by Freedom House.257 The 
Philippines and Thailand are two of the well-known examples of other democratic countries 
within the region, but both receive ratings of partly free due largely to undemocratic principles 
that occur in both countries.
258
  
 In regards to internationally criticized events in Burma, ASEAN, as an organization, was 
able to uphold the principles of non-interference and quiet diplomacy with Burma. Although 
Burma experienced significant international condemnation following the brutal repression of 
civilian protests in 1988 and the elections of 1990, where the government refused to hand over 
power, ASEAN remained fairly irrelevant to the outside world until its decision to admit Burma 
in 1997. The year 1997 was arguably a significant turning point for ASEAN and Southeast Asia 
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as a whole. It marked the year of the Asian financial crisis, initially caused by a collapse of the 
Thai baht and spread throughout the region, devaluing currencies and crashing stock markets.
259
 
On a more positive note, Burma and Laos were admitted to ASEAN in 1997. Although 
Cambodia’s admittance was deferred in 1997, the organization was on its way to encompassing 
all ten states of the region, making it truly representative of the entire region.
260
 East Timor was 
still a part of Indonesia until 1999 and didn't gain observer status to the organization until 2002. 
Additionally, only one year later would Indonesia pave the way for democratic changes after the 
resignation of Suharto. Indonesia, as one of the founding fathers of ASEAN, is the most 
influential actor in the region, as well as in the organization. 
 ASEAN, unlike the other actors engaged politically with Burma, appealed to Burma 
because it upheld the principle of non-interference. In a sense, this provided the groundwork for 
Burma to achieve a feeling of acceptance and legitimacy upon joining ASEAN in 1997. Through 
joining, Burma felt it had gained a more prominent image in the global community, but due to 
the principles of quiet diplomacy and non-intervention it would be able to continue its neutrality 
and isolationist foreign policies and maintain its sovereignty. Burma saw the benefits of being 
part of a regional organization including not only international recognition, but also access to 
trade and monetary benefits, and a sense of security.
261 
Burma also saw ASEAN as a means to 
escape the diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions from major Western actors. By joining 
ASEAN, Burma showed that it understood that in order to survive in a globalizing and growing 
world, international recognition and approval were necessary. 
 This action came during the time of the shift from Westphalian sovereignty being the 
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most upheld international norm to legitimacy and recognition being the most important. In 
order for Burma to maintain its Westphalian sovereignty in a world where liberalization and 
democratization were growing norms, it needed to establish itself as a recognized participant in 
the changing system of states. Burma's incentive for joining ASEAN is seen as a way to try and 
establish the recognition and legitimacy behind international legal sovereignty. The other 
member states of ASEAN had experienced a strengthening of international legal sovereignty 
among themselves since the founding of ASEAN, especially as ASEAN entered dialogue 
partnerships with stronger institutions and actors. The member states not only gained legal 
sovereignty between each other, but also in the eyes of major Western powers. Through 
ASEAN, Burmese officials believed they would also be able to obtain this type of sovereignty 
needed to be a recognized, legitimate actor, while still controlling the territory as they pleased. 
At the time of Burma's admittance to the organization, some member countries were 
undergoing some form of liberalization. As Jörn Dosch, an international relations scholar, says, 
“[in the post-Cold War era] political change, and increasingly open and liberal political spheres 
across Southeast Asia have resulted in a broadening and deepening of security discourses, to 
which ASEAN now has to respond.”262 The biggest security discourse that arose was that of 
human security and individual freedoms.
263 
In 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers had been dealing 
with regional members via a policy known as “constructive engagement.” The policy was coined 
by Arsa Sarasin, Thailand's foreign minister, in 1991.
264 
Member states believed that 
encouraging trade and diplomatic and economic ties with member countries would produce 
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liberalization more than the Western approach of isolation and condemnation.
265 
ASEAN 
members hoped that granting Burma membership would decrease its dependency on China and 
in turn anchor Burma within a Southeast Asian community.
266 
In 1997 the ministers of ASEAN 
already recognized that Burma could create a legitimacy problem for the organization, as 
Burmese leaders were required to promise that “for admittance they would keep their house in 
order.”267 The regime attempted to strengthen its international image with its admittance to 
ASEAN with the change of its name from SLORC to SPDC.
268
 
Western dialogue partners responded to Burma's membership status in the organization 
by boycotting ASEAN activities and reminding ASEAN that it was now accountable for Burma's 
actions.
269 
It wasn't until 2000, three years later, that ASEAN was able to restore full cooperation 
with the European Union. For continued EU support, ASEAN had to promise to promote and 
protect human rights in its region.
270 
These actions illustrate the effects of institutions in the 
modern world. The powerful actors, namely the United States and European Union, have been 
able to set the international norms regarded as international law. In addition to unilaterally, or 
directly engaging with Burma, they use ASEAN as an agent to exert their influence. The fact that 
both actors denote ASEAN as accountable for Burma, exhibits that ASEAN has some level of 
sovereignty, which in this situation is considered more legitimate than Burma's sovereignty. By 
threatening the legitimacy of ASEAN, member states feel their sovereignties threatened. 
ASEAN as an institution was already being forced to conform to a world where institutions were 
becoming more legally binding and accountable to their members, in order to maintain its 
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international legitimacy as an important international and regional actor. 
 One year after Burma was admitted to ASEAN, former Thai Foreign Minister, Surin 
Pitsuwan, pushed for ASEAN to accept his policy of “flexible engagement” with regards to 
Burma. Under this policy, ASEAN would be able to discuss and comment on the domestic 
affairs of member-states if the affairs had cross-border implications, or concerned the matters of 
other member states. This idea not only challenged ASEAN's non-interference principle but also 
the norm of quiet diplomacy as it allowed for the public discussion of members domestic 
affairs.
271 
This policy was rejected by numerous member state representatives on the basis that it 
violated ASEAN's well established norms of non-interference and quiet diplomacy. As a 
compromise, however, the policy of “enhanced interaction” was established, which allowed 
individual member states to comment on other members' domestic affairs. Although ASEAN 
justified this new policy on the ground that the organization as a whole was not condemning the 
domestic affairs of member states,
272 
it was one of the first steps in the loosening of the policies 
of the “ASEAN Way” with regards to Burma. 
 Surin Pitsuwan's proposal is a perfect example of the importance of the legitimacy of 
institutions in maintaining international order and pursuing action against another actor. 
Pitsuwan's desire to use ASEAN as an institution to deal with Burma, instead of unilaterally 
condemning Burma, shows that the Thai Foreign Minister viewed ASEAN's sovereignty and 
capabilities as more credible. Although his idea was rejected by other member states, the newly 
established compromise entitled individual member states the right to unilaterally comment on 
and criticize the domestic affairs of other member states, if the issue at hand threatened the 
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security of the condemner. This situation displays ASEAN's legitimacy over the region, as 
consensus by ASEAN members was required to permit unilateral diplomatic intervention by 
member states. In a world where institutions are irrelevant, a state would not feel the need to 
seek the approval of the representative institution before acting unilaterally. This example 
displays how individual members felt the importance to work multilaterally through ASEAN 
with regards to Burma, in order to express their desired actions as credible and gain the support 
of a larger support group, needed to make the action more legitimate. 
The Depayin incident in 2003 was the next major credibility downfall for ASEAN and 
Burma. International criticism of Burma was sparked by the junta's decision to return Aung San 
Suu Kyi to house arrest, followed by the failure of the regime to respond to the international 
demands for her release.
273 
The European Union and the United States both increased economic 
sanctions  and  issued  travel  and  visa  restrictions  for  Burmese  officials.
274 
ASEAN leaders 
realized the negative credibility that the incident placed on the organization, and therefore on 
themselves. On many occasions following the Depayin incident leaders of many member states 
publicly condemned Burma, but through the “we” voice of ASEAN, instead of unilaterally as a 
public leader of a specific country. The use of the “we” voice in these statements, violated 
ASEAN's terms of non-interference and quiet diplomacy. 
 At the annual meeting of foreign ministers in Phnom Penh in June 2003, ASEAN ministers 
issued a joint statement for the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi. This was the first time 
that the organization took a collective position against a member, and the first time that the 
organization took a collective stance against a regional neighbor since Vietnam invaded 
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Cambodia.
275 
By using ASEAN as the mediator between Burma and the rest, the leaders were 
able to justify their actions and statements as more credible in two ways. First, by using ASEAN 
as the messenger, instead of an individual country, Burma felt increasing pressure to comply 
since ASEAN was its key to international recognition. Secondly, using ASEAN allowed 
ASEAN to uphold its credibility and sovereignty against pressures from the more powerful 
international actors concerned with Burma. 
A second example of ASEAN being used by an actor to address concerns within Burma 
was at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) of foreign ministers in July 2003. At this meeting, 
Thailand's foreign minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, introduced the idea of a road map for Burma 
that would bring about national reconciliation and democratic reforms within a three year 
period.
276 
Surakiart Sathirathai and other ASEAN ministers were concerned about the legitimacy 
and credibility problems ASEAN could face when Burma took over the ASEAN Chair as 
scheduled in 2006. The proposed roadmap by the Thai foreign minister included five steps: the 
release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders and the reopening of NLD 
headquarters, the release of all political detainees and an investigation into the Depayin incident, 
the  drafting  and  adoption  of  a  new  Constitution,  a  successful  transitional  period  prior  to 
elections, which would result in all sanctions being lifted, and finally the holding of national 
elections overseen by international monitors.
277
  
Surakiart Sathirathai met with U Win Aung, the Burmese foreign minister, and discussed 
the need for Burma to create its own roadmap to democracy. The pressure of ASEAN on Burma 
was successful enough, as Burma introduced its new seven-point roadmap for “disciplined 
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democracy” only one month later.278 Jürgen Haacke, a political science scholar of ASEAN and 
Burmese foreign policy, argues that there are two major factors that contribute to a tense 
relationship between ASEAN and Burma. First, there is increasing international pressure on the 
association and its individual members to initiate change within Burma. By allowing Burma 
membership in the organization, the leading actors of the international community are holding 
ASEAN and its members now accountable for the lack of democracy and respect for human 
rights within Burma. Second, many governments within Southeast Asia view the situation in 
Burma as a credibility issue to the organization, and therefore to themselves, as most of the 
member states are not competitive on a global scale without the umbrella of the organization.
279
 
The discussion of the need for a roadmap to democracy, and Burma's compliance with the 
introduction of its own remodeled roadmap, display the influence ASEAN leaders have in the 
democratization of Burma. Through the voice of ASEAN, member states made it clear that 
Burma needed to embark on a liberalization path leading into the year it would chair the 
organization. Without this action, ASEAN ministers realized the credibility that Burma chairing 
the organization would cost them, as well as the organization as a whole. Burma's compliance 
with the demand for a roadmap to democracy in 2003 shows that the use of ASEAN as an 
institution provides more leverage over the liberalization than any unilateral action by one actor.  
 In November 2004, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Cambodia, and the 
Philippines convened and founded AIPMC, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, in 
each of their states. This unified each of the six national parliamentary caucuses on the issue of 
Burma as it pertained to each individual nation and ASEAN as a whole. The goal of this new 
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caucus was to “promote liberal-interventionist policies towards Myanmar.”280 The creation of 
AIPMC is another example of ASEAN being used as an umbrella by individual actors to 
strengthen and legitimate their opinions on Burma, stressing the importance of institutions in 
bringing about change. Although the caucuses were independent national entities, created 
individually by the states previously listed, the caucuses were joined under the umbrella of 
ASEAN by linking them all to ASEAN's name and utilizing the “we” voice. 
AIPMC in these six states met from 2004 to 2005. It is arguably the actions and 
statements issued by these caucuses that pressured Burma to relinquish the 2006 ASEAN Chair 
in 2005.
281 
Each of these states, whether because of its own national democratic and liberal 
human rights views or because of legitimacy problems their own countries were facing in light 
of Burma, individually placed criticism on the Burmese junta. These criticisms violated 
ASEAN’s principle of non-interference because the network of national parliamentary caucuses 
has come under an umbrella caucus, AIPMC, pertaining to ASEAN as an organization. 
Although the United States and European Union have placed strict economic sanctions on 
Burma, Burma has been able to rely on regional neighbors for economic support and business. 
Singapore is one such country that has financial investments in Burma. Following the Cold War, 
Singaporean businesses began investing in and trading with Burma, while encouraging gradual 
change in the country. Due to Singapore’s highly oligarchic regime, which shows more interest in 
economic gains than liberal legislation, Singapore was not interested in nor qualified to push for 
significant liberal reform in Burma prior to the Depayin incident in 2003.
282 
By 2003 Singapore 
was facing threats of U.S. economic sanctions because of its relationship with the junta. 
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Singapore saw this as a threat to its ability to compete in world financial markets. Singapore was 
also pushed to criticize the junta because the events around 2003 severely threatened the corporate 
image of ASEAN in which Singapore has a significant stake.
283
 
 Indonesian legislators have the strongest AIPMC of the six member states largely due to 
their stance on democracy and liberal reform within Indonesia, as well as ASEAN. The 2004 
democratic elections in Indonesia resulted in a significant handover of power, with seventy-three 
percent new membership in parliament. Many of these new politicians were invested in the 
promotion of democracy and human rights in the region.
284 
They sought to achieve this through 
asserting significant influence over ASEAN as a political organization and used the issue of 
Burma as its basis for arguing for this agenda.
285 
AIPMC in Indonesia has issued statements, 
which have invited exiled Burmese MPs for hearings, blocked the acceptance of Burma’s 
ambassador to Jakarta and delayed sending an ambassador from Indonesia to Burma from 2006 
until at least 2014, the year Burma is now due to take over the chair. Indonesia’s AIPMC was 
also able to pass a resolution against Burma chairing ASEAN, exemplifying Indonesia’s concern 
for ASEAN’s image and its relations with the democratic Western world.286  
 The lack of economic investments in Burma has allowed for liberal legislators in the 
Philippines to have the political space necessary to critique the domestic affairs of Burma. 
Domestically, AIPMC in the Philippines was able to unanimously pass a non-binding Senate 
Resolution in 2005 that called for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and stated that Burma should 
only accept the ASEAN Chair if it displayed significant democratic progress. On an international 
level, AIPMC in the Philippines passed a resolution which called on foreign legislatures to create 
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their own caucuses in order to press sanctions against Burma.
287
 
 
Although there are six ASEAN member states which have founded an AIPMC, only three 
have been able to successfully criticize or pass legislation against the regime in Burma. 
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand have not been as successful with AIMPC. This does not 
mean that these countries have been unsuccessful in criticizing the regime in Burma or 
addressing the international concern for ASEAN's legitimacy, however. Thailand has been an 
important advocate for intervention in the domestic affairs of the country, just not through 
legislation with the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus. The fact, however, that all 
six countries involved themselves in an ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus against Burma 
shows that these countries addressed some level of concern over how Burma affected the image 
of ASEAN. The creation of this inter-parliamentary caucus under ASEAN’s name breaches the 
policies of quiet diplomacy and non-interference from an organizational standpoint. Although 
ASEAN had agreed that “enhanced interaction” allowed for member states to individually 
comment on the domestic affairs of Burma, the idea of AIPMC breaches this policy, as the 
individual national parliamentary caucuses are speaking on behalf of an ASEAN caucus. 
As a member of ASEAN, Burma is eligible for the chair of the organization based on a 
rotational system between all member countries. Burma was scheduled to chair the organization 
in 2006. Although ASEAN could not formally forbid Burma from taking the chair, the leaders of 
the association were able to apply enough pressure on the Burmese government to make Burma 
withdraw its request in 2005. Both the EU and US threatened ASEAN that they would not attend 
any meetings hosted by Burma or provide any funding for development projects within ASEAN 
                                                          
287
 Jones, “Democratization and foreign policy in Southeast Asia,” 401. 
86 
 
countries if Burma chaired the organization.
288 
ASEAN pressured Burma to step down from the 
position with the argument that it needed to concentrate on its roadmap to democracy. After 
announcing its resignation, Burma moved the capital from Rangoon to Naypyidaw overnight, a 
location further from the coast, where student and activist groups were minimal.
289 
Burma's 
decision to relinquish its turn to the ASEAN Chair in 2006 was a combination of pressure from 
external actors and issues of legitimacy. Of particular importance was Western pressure on 
ASEAN, liberal and democratic changes in the policies of other member states, and institutional 
changes occurring within ASEAN, as members realized the need to transform ASEAN in line 
with new global trends.
290 
It officially forfeited its turn in July 2005, months before it would have 
taken over the position. In forfeiting its turn to chair the organization, Burma was faced with the 
difficulty of losing legitimacy. Both Burma and ASEAN as a whole were losing credibility in 
2005, with the idea of the junta chairing the organization, and ASEAN's overall liberal changes 
were reflected, in pressuring Burma to relinquish its turn to the chair. 
Since admitting Burma to the organization in 1997, ASEAN has increasingly faced 
international pressure and declining legitimacy from its major Western dialogue partners. These 
dialogue partners, particularly the European Union and the United States, feel that ASEAN needs 
to be more involved in the monitoring and reform process of Burma's domestic affairs. As a 
growing region and regional organization, Southeast Asia and ASEAN need the legitimacy from 
major Western countries and organizations to be considered credible and competitive on a global 
scale. After the Depayin incident and leading up to Burma's takeover of the ASEAN Chair, the 
United States and European Union threatened to boycott any ASEAN meeting chaired by 
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Burma.
291 
These threats placed ASEAN leaders in an uncomfortable position between 
maintaining the credibility of the organization and upholding the traditional policy of non- 
interference. 
 Less than one month after Burma announced its decision to relinquish its turn to chair 
ASEAN, Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the current chair of the organization and the prime 
minister of Malaysia, spoke on behalf of ASEAN on the importance of expediting democratic 
reforms in Burma and the release of those still detained. Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi titled his 
statement, “One Vision, One Identity, One Community,”292 implying that ASEAN was one 
community, with one unifying identity that had one vision about its policies and development. 
Point 34 of his statement concerns Burma's domestic affairs and the implications they have for 
ASEAN: 
We noted the increased interest of the international community on 
developments in Myanmar. In this context, we took note of the 
briefing by Myanmar on the latest developments in the 
implementation of its roadmap to democracy. We encouraged 
Myanmar to expedite the process and welcomed the invitation by 
Myanmar to the Foreign Minister of Malaysia in his capacity as 
Chairman of the ASEAN standing committee to visit Myanmar to 
learn first-hand of the process. We also called for the release of 
those placed under detention.
293
 
 
The use of “we” in his statement implies that the criticism is coming from ASEAN as a whole, 
and not an individual member state. Through the use of “we,” he states that ASEAN encouraged 
Burma to speed up its democratic reform after recognizing the increasing interest of the 
international community on the affairs of Burma. This implies that not only do the member states 
feel their legitimacy threatened by Burma's affairs, but they realize that ASEAN, as a developing 
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international association, is at risk of losing its credibility. His use of “we” is also implying to 
other international actors that ASEAN as a whole is taking a stance against Burma and making 
itself accountable for the progress within Burma. 
 Burma’s foreign minister at the time, U Nyan Win, gave the formal resignation at the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Vientiane in July 2005. U Nyan Win presented the excuse 
that Burma wanted to “focus its attention on national reconciliation and democratization” without 
the added responsibilities of chairing the organization.
294 
In giving up its chance to chair the 
organization as scheduled in 2006, Burma became more aware of the burdens of being a part of 
an international association that needed to be responsive to outside, international pressures. 
Burma's realization that it needed to conform to certain international standards, in order to obtain 
the legitimacy it needed to gain recognition as a respected member of ASEAN, became clear in 
the years following 2005. 
Only one major anti-government action took place while the junta ruled Burma from 
 
1988 until 2010: the Saffron Rebellion protests of 2007. The protests began in September 2007 
after the government introduced a drastic price increase for natural gas and diesel, causing food 
and transportation prices to rise significantly. Small protests began with former students of the 
1988 protests, but the majority of the protests were peaceful marches by Buddhist monks.
295 
The regime responded by shooting and beating some of the monks and lay people protesting. 
The response to the protests drew high levels of international attention and criticism.
296 
Prior to 
these events in January, ASEAN leaders responded to UN Security Council discussions and a 
vote on a draft resolution for Burma by agreeing that maintaining ASEAN's credibility as an 
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effective regional organization was of utmost importance.
297 
At the 12
th 
ASEAN Summit in 
Cebu, Philippines in January 2007, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo addressed in her 
Chairperson's Statement, “One Caring and Sharing Community,” an agreement “on the need to 
preserve ASEAN's credibility as an effective regional organization by demonstrating a capacity 
to manage important issues within the region.”298 
ASEAN's role as an institution was apparent in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis that 
devastated the delta region of Burma on May 3, 2008. The role of ASEAN in the situation was 
vital because the military junta refused and obstructed relief and assistance from foreign donors 
and observers in the wake of the devastation. A collective response from ASEAN came two days 
following the cyclone, calling all member states to provide relief assistance for those in need 
within Burma.
299 
On May 8
th
, the Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan, initiated the launching of an 
“ASEAN Cooperation Fund” in order to raise money for relief resources.300 On May 9, 2008, 
Surin Pitsuwan urged Nyan Win, Burma's Foreign Minister, to allow an ASEAN relief mission to 
enter the country to provide immediate assistance. He made it clear that this ASEAN team would 
be solely for providing relief and rescuing those in need and would not carry out any assessment 
report on the situation. Despite this, the junta still refused assistance on the basis that it was 
suspicious of any foreign invasion of its borders. Eventually a “less intrusive ASEAN Emergency 
Rapid Assessment Team” was allowed to enter Rangoon to write a quick assessment of the 
situation. It was clear that the junta was able to manipulate what the small group had seen and 
could write about, based on positive inclinations about the regime and concerns regarding future 
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foreign relief intervention.
301
 
 ASEAN leaders met on May 19
th
 in Singapore to discuss future measures they were to take 
with regards to the humanitarian crisis in Burma. They agreed to set up an ASEAN-led 
coordination mechanism that would act as an intermediary in facilitating international aid and the 
deployment of aid workers, establish a task force under the Secretary-General to pursue relief 
coordination, and to work with the United Nations for an aid and relief conference in Burma for 
other international donors.
302 
The success of ASEAN came on June 4
th 
with the successful 
delivery of thousands of tons of relief supply into Rangoon by the TCG (ASEAN-Myanmar-UN 
Tripartite Core Group).
303 
Five days later, on June 9
th
, full-scale TCG teams were sent to Yangon 
to begin a damage assessment and relief work. The assessment teams were officially sent off by 
Kyaw Thu, the deputy foreign minister of Burma, who was also the chair of the TCG.
304
 
Although one might point to the fact that it took ASEAN a month to successfully allow 
Burma to agree to international relief intervention, ASEAN's handling of the situation displayed 
the power and legitimacy that ASEAN holds in the eyes of Burma, especially in comparison to 
the US, EU, and UN as 'Western' powers. Individual actors or other institutions, such as the 
United Nations, were unable to unilaterally or bilaterally intervene in Burma to provide disaster 
relief and humanitarian assistance. Only by working through ASEAN as an institution were these 
actors able to provide the necessary aid and relief to the affected areas. As an institution, ASEAN 
attempted to respect the values of state sovereignty valued by most ASEAN member states, and 
the growing norm for individual sovereignty, or human security, valued by the more Western, 
democratic world. ASEAN leaders worked together to create a space where the Burmese military 
                                                          
301
 Emmerson., 44.  
302
 Ibid.  
303
 Ibid., 45.  
304
 Ibid., 43. 
91 
 
leaders were comfortable in engaging and working with the organization. This created a situation 
where Burma was willing to work with ASEAN on mechanisms for relief and aid, and not a 
situation where aid and relief were being dispatched against the will of the junta. Although 
recognizing the need to protect the growing norm of human security, ASEAN leaders realized 
that Burma's trust in the organization was dependent on upholding the ASEAN principles of non- 
interference.
305 
ASEAN, as an intermediary agent, was able to create a bridge between all the 
actors, maintaining the Burmese regime's trust in the institution, while allowing for international 
donors to provide assistance and relief packages. 
Recalling the seven-point roadmap to “disciplined democracy” that Khin Nyunt had 
adopted for the country, in response to the suggested roadmap by the Thai foreign minister at the 
ASEM meeting in 2003, step four called for “adoption of the draft constitution through a national 
referendum.”306 In the wake of the 2007 protests, the junta had announced the completion of the 
National Convention on the new constitution. In February 2008, the junta declared that a 
referendum for the constitution would be held on May 10, 2008, and a date had been scheduled 
for an election in 2010.
307 
The date for the election was also set for November 7, 2010.
308 
The 
junta refused to push back the date, except in the most affected areas of the delta, in the wake of 
Cyclone Nargis. The junta refused to allow international monitors into the country to observe the 
referendum and proclaimed that the constitution had been approved by 92 percent of the voting 
population in both the inland areas and the delta two weeks later.
309 
The lack of international 
monitoring and transparency in the referendum, as well as numerous reports of manipulation, 
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caused the referendum to be seen as illegitimate by the international public. 
 During the time period between the national referendum on the constitution and the 2010 
elections, Burma managed to spark new levels of international criticism and problems for 
ASEAN. In May 2009, one month before she was to be released, the junta pressed charges 
against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, arguing that she had violated the terms of her house arrest. 
Thailand, as the ASEAN chair, issued a statement on behalf of ASEAN, calling for her release 
and the protection of her rights. 
Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair, expresses grave concern about 
recent developments relating to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, given her 
fragile health. In this connection, the Government of the Union of 
Myanmar is reminded that the ASEAN Leaders had called for the 
immediate release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Furthermore, the 
Government of the Union of Myanmar, as a responsible member 
of ASEAN, has the responsibility to protect and promote human 
rights. It is therefore called upon to provide timely and adequate 
medical care to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as well as to accord her 
humane treatment with dignity. With the eyes of the international 
community on Myanmar at present, the honour and the credibility 
of  the  Government  of  the  Union  of  Myanmar  are  at  stake. 
Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair, reaffirms ASEAN’s readiness to 
contribute constructively to the national reconciliation process and 
the peaceful transition of democracy in Myanmar.310 
 
 
 
The statement, although issued by Thailand, was done on behalf of ASEAN. The role and use of 
ASEAN in international pressure is evident in this example. Although the statement is coming 
from Thailand, it is evident from the first few words that the Thai representative is speaking on 
behalf of the entire ASEAN community as chair. The statement emphasizes that the demand for 
the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi is coming from the “ASEAN Leaders.” The 
statement reminds Burma of its membership in the association, and emphasizes the responsibility 
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Burma has to the organization, particularly to the need to respect and promote human rights. This 
statement comes within a year of all ASEAN member states signing and ratifying the new 
ASEAN Charter, a document that paves the way for a legal framework to ASEAN and states that 
all ASEAN member states must promote the respect for human rights and democratization within 
ASEAN. The Chairman's statement also reminds Burma that continued oppression of human 
rights will further delegitimize the regime in the eyes of the international community. The last 
statement begins with “Thailand” again, emphasizing that the statement is coming from Thailand 
as an actor, but then reemphasizes that Thailand, as the Chair, is speaking on behalf of all of 
ASEAN. The Thai Chairman's statement reminds Burma, that ASEAN will take action in the 
democratic transition and national reconciliation of Burma if necessary. 
In July 2009, ASEAN leaders issued a collective stance on Burma at the 42
nd 
Ministerial 
 
Meeting in Phuket, Thailand. The use of “we” was prevalent in almost every statement, implying 
that ASEAN as a whole was issuing the statements. With regards to Burma, the ASEAN leaders 
of member states “collectively called” for the immediate release of detainees, especially Aung 
San Suu Kyi, which would “pave the way” for the dialogue necessary to allow all parties to 
partake in the 2010 national elections.
311 
In response to Burma's expression that the sanctions 
imposed by the EU and the US were hampering development, in light of new improvements, 
ASEAN states that it would remain constructively engaged with Burma as a part of the ASEAN 
community building process.
312
 
 The start of a new presidency in the United States in 2009 also saw changes in US foreign 
policy towards Burma. During the Clinton and Bush administrations, US foreign policy sought 
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to isolate Burma, particularly through the use of economic and diplomatic sanctions, in hopes of 
pressuring it enough to bring about change. This has also been the stance of the European 
Union's foreign policy on Burma. Burma has also never been a “top of the agenda” concern for 
the United States, as well as the European Union, because of more pressing concerns regarding 
the Middle East and North Korea. President George W. Bush did not list Burma as a part of the 
“axis of evil.”313 One reason may be that the United States, as well as the European Union, feels 
that they can address their concerns and apply pressure through ASEAN, as an institution 
representing Burma, and a third party between the two actors, instead of engaging unilaterally 
with Burma, as they must with the “axis of evil” countries. Unlike Burma, Iraq, Iran and North 
Korea are not represented by a regional institution, like ASEAN, that engages politically on an 
international level. Thus, ASEAN has always remained the important agent for actors to use 
when engaging with Burma, providing ASEAN with a stamp of authority, legitimacy, and 
sovereignty over Burma. 
 In 2009, however, President Obama adopted a “dual-track policy” towards Burma, a move 
that can be seen as more in line with ASEAN’s desire to constructively engage with Burma to 
initiate democratic progress. Obama called for the need to maintain US sanctions on the country 
while simultaneously engaging with the Burmese regime through dialogue with senior- level 
representatives.
314 
Obama believed that this new policy would allow the political space for trust 
building between the two countries. The idea was that progress would lead to further bilateral 
relations. I, however, do not believe that the change in foreign policy towards Burma was very 
influential in bringing about the democratic transition in Burma. By the time that the United 
States decided to act unilaterally toward Burma, without ASEAN as a third party mediator, 
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Burma had already made strides towards democratization. The first major instance of US 
unilateral political engagement with Burma was Hillary Clinton's visit to Burma in December 
2011. Although a change in US policy may prove to be important in the consolidation of 
democracy, this visit came after the transition of power to Thein Sein as the new president of 
Burma. 
The national election on November 7, 2010, although not free and fair by international 
standards due to the exclusion of certain parties, much fraud and irregularities and reported low 
voter turnout, was a successful contribution towards democracy in Burma, argued ASEAN.
315
  
With the election also came the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from the house arrest she had 
endured since the Depayin incident in 2003. The transfer of power to the new president, U 
Thein Sein, prime minister under the former military regime, occurred successfully on March 
30, 2011.
316 
ASEAN leaders responded to the election and transition of power through positive 
remarks regarding Burma's progress in the seven-step roadmap to democracy. ASEAN ministers 
called on the US and EU to remove their sanctions in response to Burma's successful progress in 
democratization.
317 
Neither actor completely removed the sanctions, although both actors 
lightened sanctions or began to engage more personally with Burma after 2011. 
At the 18
th 
ASEAN Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, the chair's statement states that Burma 
 
has requested to chair the organization in 2014 and that the leaders of ASEAN are considering the 
request, based on the liberal progress made in the 2010 elections and formation of a new 
parliament.
318 
ASEAN decided that it would not make a final decision regarding Burma's request 
                                                          
315
 Turnell, 150-151.  
316
 Hlaing, 197.  
317
 Boisseau du Rocher, 175.  
318
 “ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations,” Chair’s Statement of the 18
th
 ASEAN Summit in Indonesia, 
Jakarta, (May 2011).  
96 
 
until the Indonesian foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, representing Indonesia as the current 
chair of ASEAN, had carried out an assessment of the political developments inside of Burma.
319
 
 Although the trip was delayed, it was carried out in late October 2011, and Burma was 
granted the right to the 2014 Chair during the 19
th 
ASEAN Summit in Bali on November 17, 
2011.
320
  The leaders of ASEAN agreed that Burma had shown significant progress in democratic 
reform since the 2010 election, and that allowing the country to chair the organization was in line 
with ASEAN's desire to encourage momentum in this progressive direction.
321
 
 
ASEAN leaders 
agreed that a ‘behaving Burma’ within ASEAN would only strengthen ASEAN's legitimacy and 
credibility as an international institution, and therefore hoped that they would be encouraging 
further reform within Burma by rewarding progress.
322
 
The ASEAN Chair, the Answer? 
 
 Burma’s request for the 2014 ASEAN Chair weeks after the 2010 election is an indication 
of Burma’s understanding of the importance of its democratization. The ASEAN chair rotates 
between all ten member states on a ten year cycle in alphabetical order by the English 
language.
323 
Burma, having given up its opportunity to chair the organization in 2006 was due to 
chair the organization in 2016.
324 
Instead of waiting for its turn in 2016, it expressed its desire to 
chair the organization in 2014 in place of Laos, only two years before its scheduled opportunity. 
It is puzzling as to why Burma was so eager to chair the organization before its scheduled year 
only two years away. The key answer to this puzzle is the need for international legitimacy and 
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recognition. 
 As I have already argued, ASEAN has suffered a decline in international legitimacy since 
admitting Burma due to political occurrences within the country. Burma has fought a losing battle 
for international legitimacy through its oppressive military regime, suppression of democratic 
movements, isolation from the outside world, and less-than-desired human rights record. 
Legitimacy issues began in the early 1990s as sovereignty became more layered with the rise of 
institutions, particularly institutions revolving around the norms of international law, human 
rights, and democracy. Prior to the acceleration of this new global trend, in a world of newly 
independent states, Westphalian sovereignty was “the only game in town,” as a state could only 
be recognized as a state if it had a central government within an internationally determined set of 
boundaries. The rise of institutions through the need to facilitate international cooperation, trust, 
information and order in the international system moved the idea of Westphalian sovereignty 
from being the only game in town to being a necessary, but not sufficient, aspect to the game, to 
be a legitimate actor in a globalizing international system.  State sovereignty became layered with 
interdependence, domestic, and international legal sovereignty. Sovereignty, as an institution, 
became further distributed among institutions, states, and individuals, as state sovereignty and the 
respect for a state’s sovereignty became conditional on following the changing rules and norms 
governing the system of states. In order for a state to exercise its full right to sovereignty, it must 
conform to the trend, set by the powerful, democratic states of the Western world. Institutions also 
exercise this type of sovereignty, as they exercise authority over members. In order to exercise 
their sovereignty, institutions must also conform to the norms and ideals of the liberalizing system. 
ASEAN’s sovereignty, or legitimacy, is in decline because of its resistance, or the resistance of 
particular member states, to liberalize with the system.  
98 
 
 Before the creation of ASEAN, the to-be-member-states had only recently acquired 
Westphalian sovereignty. The organization was established in order to protect the Westphalian 
sovereignty of the newly independent countries. As sovereignty became layered through the rise 
of institutions, these member states were able to obtain international legal sovereignty, as they 
began to engage with larger international actors and institutions, particularly through ASEAN. 
ASEAN, in a sense, created a layer of sovereignty over its individual member states as it became 
the international representative of the countries on the international scale. This also meant that 
ASEAN, in the eyes of more influential international actors and institutions, had a level of 
accountability over its individual members. As the global trend moved in the direction of a world 
driven by institutions, conforming to the democratic and liberal ideas of Western powers, ASEAN 
was faced with the difficulty of being pressured to adapt to the global trend, or risk losing 
importance in the global arena. Although the individual member states have tried to fight the 
global trend by fighting for the principles of the ASEAN Way, the consistent struggle to maintain 
legitimacy, in addition to the liberalizing policies of some member states, notably Indonesia and 
the Philippines, has caused ASEAN to slowly conform to the legitimizing international norms of 
institutions. 
 One of the main reasons why Burmese leaders sought membership in the organization 
was to obtain the level of legitimacy that the other Southeast Asian states were achieving in part 
through the organization. The Burmese regime realized that remaining isolated was threatening 
to its sovereignty, as well as making it harder to survive in a globalizing world. For the regime, 
membership in ASEAN would mean that Burma would not only be recognized by the other 
Southeast Asian member states, as ASEAN was becoming representative of the entire region, 
but it would also gain recognition from ASEAN's dialogue and economic partners, or so it 
99 
 
hoped. Following the admittance of Burma, ASEAN leaders realized that the reputation of the 
organization was stuck in limbo between wanting to represent the entire Southeast Asian 
region, diversity and all through its “ASEAN-Way” diplomacy, while not losing the recognition 
it had built up with the rest of the international community. Over time, ASEAN leaders realized 
that they were going to have to compromise, acting out of self-interest by adopting some of the 
norms and ideals desired by larger international actors, in order to save the reputation of the 
organization, which was vital to their own reputation and credibility. The leaders of the 
association began to use ASEAN to engage with Burma, upholding as many traditional 
principles as possible while also acting and conforming to the interests and pressure of the 
international community. The liberal changes of ASEAN member states and the strengthening 
of ASEAN as an institution became further legitimized as certain members became more 
democratic, identifying with the international norms of democracy and human security. 
 Although the process was slow and interrupted by periods of backward regression and 
major human rights violations, Burma realized that ASEAN was the answer to gaining 
legitimacy, as ASEAN, as an institution, was the only actor of significant importance to Burma 
that was actively engaging with the country. The United States and the European Union were both 
isolating the country through sanctions, creating no space for relationship building between 
actors. The importance of ASEAN to Burma, as well as proof that ASEAN was able to develop a 
relationship with Burma was particularly evident in the aftermath of the cyclone that devastated 
the delta region of the country. This displayed the trust that Burma had in the association, as well 
as the ability of ‘ASEAN’s image’ to produce change within Burma. However, it became evident 
to the regime that membership in the organization was not sufficient to obtain the necessary 
legitimacy it desired. In order to obtain full international legitimacy, the leaders of Burma, on 
100 
 
behalf of Burma, first needed to prove to the other member states that Burma was a worthy 
member of the organization before being viewed as a credible actor by the international 
community. It became evident, after ASEAN leaders were able to pressure Burma to relinquish its 
turn to the chair in 2006, that the credibility of the institution on an international level was of vital 
importance to the other member states, and that Burma was going to have to successfully show 
that it could chair the organization before gaining further legitimacy as an ASEAN member. This 
is why the ASEAN Chair was so important, in the eyes of the regime, for Burma's recognition. 
Why didn't Burma wait until its turn in 2016? I argue that there are two potential reasons: 
the regime believed that ASEAN's stamp of approval by allowing Burma to chair the 
organization sooner would display that Burma was legitimate in the eyes of the other ASEAN 
member states, and second the legitimacy would be vital going into the next national elections 
set for 2015. By waiting for 2016 and taking over the chair as scheduled, Burma wasn't gaining 
as strong a stamp of approval, since the international community already had some indication or 
expectation that Burma was to chair the organization in this year, a rite of passage as a member 
state. Obtaining ASEAN's approval to the chair, Burma hoped to show the international 
community that it was “joining in the game” and wanted to be a valued player. By successfully 
chairing ASEAN, Burma would host and lead all summit meetings and conferences between 
ASEAN ministers and between ASEAN and its international dialogue partners. This opportunity 
would provide Burma with the recognition and credibility that it needed to remain a legitimate 
state actor in today's world. 
 The transfer of power to a “democratic” government in Burma in 2010-2011 is a classic 
example of a “top-down” approach to democratization, common among authoritarian and military 
governments in liberalizing countries, as I have already argued in Part II of this paper. The desire 
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to obtain legitimacy as a respected sovereign state really indicated that the military leaders of the 
country wanted to legitimate their right to rule. Following the 1999 election in Indonesia, a 
government was established based on the 1945 Constitution where twenty-five percent of all seats 
were reserved for the military, comparable to the current Burmese parliament. By the time of the 
next national election in 2004, the constitution had undergone significant democratic amendments 
and no longer was any part of the executive or legislative branch reserved for military 
members.
325
  The approved 2008 Constitution in Burma would legally allow the military to 
maintain ultimate power over governmental affairs. Therefore, even after the election and transfer 
of power in 2011, the government remained dominated by the military, covered by a democratic 
mask. The legitimacy obtained through chairing ASEAN in 2014 would in turn bring legitimacy 
to the military rulers. Waiting until 2016 would mean that the new government elected in 2015 
would carry out Burma's responsibilities as ASEAN chair. The military could experience a 
significant decline in power if it continues to undergo democratic change leading into the 2015 
election. Chairing the organization in 2014 would mean that the current military leaders would be 
the ones in the spotlight. 
Remarks on the years between 2011 and 2014 and Burma's first few months as chair 
 
 To the surprise of the international community, the years following the transfer of power to 
U Thein Sein have seen many more democratic reforms than expected. The details to these 
reforms have been previously addressed in detail in Part II. What is significant, are the 
international responses to reforms in the time between ASEAN's announcement that Burma 
would chair the organization in 2014 and the day Burma accepted the chair. Not even a month 
after ASEAN announced its decision to allow Burma to chair ASEAN in 2014, U.S. Secretary of 
State, Hillary Clinton, visited Aung San Suu Kyi and Burmese officials in Burma in December 
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2011. This marked the beginning of eased diplomatic sanctions from Western countries.
326 
At an 
ASEAN meeting in February 2012 before the 2012 by-election in Burma took place, Secretary-
General Surin Pitsuwan encouraged Burma to consider allowing ASEAN observers to attend the 
by-election. “On 20 March, the Myanmar government invited the ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN 
Member States, as well as the European Union and the United States to send observation teams to 
witness the by-elections on 1 April 2012.”327 Not only did Burma acknowledge the request made 
by Surin Pitsuwan on behalf of ASEAN, but it extended the offer to the international 
community.
328 
This can be seen in line with Burma's desire to obtain legitimacy within ASEAN 
as well as among the strong international actors, particularly the United States and the European 
Union. Whether or not because of the international observers, the elections were fairly 
transparent, free and fair, allowing nearly all political parties to participate, notably the NLD, and 
peacefully transferring power to the new representatives, including Aung San Suu Kyi. In 
November after the 2012 by-elections, President Obama made a personal visit to the Burma. In 
2012 the United States under President Obama also restored full diplomatic relations and re-
established a USAID (United States Agency for International Development) mission in 
Burma.
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 Although Burma’s term as ASEAN Chair did not officially begin until January 1, 2014, 
the “ceremonial handover” of the chair from Brunei to Burma occurred in October 2013. In U 
Thein Sein's speech at the 23
rd 
ASEAN Summit on October 9, 2013 in Brunei, U Thein Sein 
addressed the strengthening of an ASEAN community for the future, as well as Burma's role in 
ASEAN in light of accepting the chair. He acknowledged that “reforms are incomplete and that 
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the country still faces many challenges.”330 However he emphasized that the support of the 
ASEAN member states and the ASEAN dialogue partners will only assist Burma in easing these 
challenges. In his vows to take over the chair, as the representative of the country, U Thein Sein 
acknowledges the importance that reform has had thus far in integrating Burma with the other 
ASEAN member states, as well as vowing that Burma will continue to work with the ASEAN 
member states towards the 2015 target goals for the desired ASEAN Community.
331
 
In 2014, Burma is already scheduled to host 280 bloc meetings, which includes 2 major summits, 
the 24
th 
ASEAN Summit and the 25
th 
ASEAN Summit, which will occur in Burma in May and 
October respectively. The country has already successfully hosted an ASEAN Foreign Minister's 
Meeting from January 15-18, 2014 in Bagan, Burma. At the meeting, the ministers discussed the 
prospects for the ASEAN Community by 2015.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The study of democratization in both international relations theory and comparative 
politics has become an increasingly popular and intriguing focus for research. In today’s system 
of states, democracy is proving itself to be one of the most successful mechanisms of survival. 
Unlike the early to mid-1900s, when democracy flourished only to be challenged in a series of 
waves and reverse waves, democracy since the late 1990s has prospered and become legitimized 
as “the only game in town.” Arguably, since the late 1990s, no reverse wave of democratization 
has occurred. The world is moving toward a system of states where democratic values are no 
longer only desired or suggested, but are seen as normative conditions for international 
recognition. 
Although considered to be institutionalized in international law, the principles of 
democracy are not accepted by all states. Some states in the system deliberately challenge 
democracy. Many of these states, particularly those ruled by ideological extremists, personal 
dictators, or the military tend to be referred to as “rogue states.” The question of how to produce 
or foster democratization in “rogue” countries is a leading question researched by students and 
professionals in this field. 
 The Burmese case presents new factors that should be examined in the democratization 
of future failed, weak, or rogue states. Democratization in Burma, fostered by actors through 
the use of ASEAN as an agent, raises the importance of regional organizations and institutions 
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in producing change. In my research, I concluded that it was not unilateral or bilateral pressure 
on Burma that produced liberalization, nor was it the result of Western sanctions or 
intervention. Instead, ASEAN, as the most important regional organization, was used by 
various actors, both member states and dialogue partners, to pressure Burma to liberalize. 
Using ASEAN proved to be more successful than bilateral or unilateral mechanisms because 
Burma desired to remain a member of ASEAN, hoping to gain international legitimacy through 
the organization. 
In Part III, I present my argument through a chronology of ASEAN reactions to the 
domestic affairs of Burma, showing how the statements presented reflected a collective stance, 
or “we-ness” on the issue. Admitting Burma as a member during a time when human rights and 
democratic principles were becoming institutionalized as universal norms challenged the 
credibility of ASEAN with regards to major Western dialogue partners, and threatened 
ASEAN’s diplomacy of non-interference and quiet diplomacy. In response to the global liberal 
trend, ASEAN leaders were faced with a legitimacy crisis, choosing between upholding 
“ASEAN Way” diplomacy and remaining a respected organization in the international system. 
Further challenges to traditional diplomacy arose as individual member states in the region 
democratized or introduced significant liberal reforms. The comparative political scientist 
Samuel Huntington's independent variables, changes in the policies of external actors and 
deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian states, plus the international relations concepts 
of sovereignty and legitimacy, were the variables in the equation that ultimately produced the 
beginning of a democratic transition in Burma. 
 Since the beginning of the Huntington’s Third Wave, democracy and individual freedoms 
have become top agenda concerns of many Western states. The policies of many actors are 
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conforming to this new global trend of liberal thought, institutionalizing the ideas as normative 
aspects of international law and state behavior. The Western democratic powers have embedded 
democratic and liberal aspects into the international institutions important to world order and 
cooperation. Not only is it seen appropriate and necessary to comply with the international 
standards of democracy and human rights, but it is also viewed as necessary to participate in and 
abide by the rules of the numerous international institutions. 
When the idea of international institutions arose, membership was assumed to be 
voluntary. Joining an international institution meant giving up part of your state sovereignty for 
the greater good of the community within the institution. Benefits of membership, however, 
included recognition as part of the in-group and strengthened security and legitimacy. 
Institutions foster information dissemination among states and legitimize actions against or 
critiques of member states through the protection of multilateral action. Compliance with 
international institutions is becoming increasingly less voluntary as liberal values become more 
legitimized through international law. Non-member states are being pressured to comply with 
these standards, or risk becoming stigmatized by the international community. Burma had 
incentives for joining ASEAN because it believed that by joining an international institution it 
would gain credibility and legitimacy in the international system. The ASEAN Way diplomacy, 
however, appealed to Burma since it would allow the regime to participate in an international 
organization while maintaining its sovereign right to rule as it pleased. 
 As argued in this thesis, the major gain Burma saw in joining ASEAN, the need for 
legitimacy as a credible, competitive sovereign state, was the incentive that persuaded Burma to 
democratize. State sovereignty, especially international legal sovereignty, is becoming conditional 
and susceptible to the changing norms and trends of the international system. This form of 
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sovereignty claims that states are sovereign if they mutually recognize one another and view one 
another as equals, in terms of having the right to be a state, in the international arena. As more 
states democratize and join the system of institutions, international law becomes more 
legitimized and gains more strength as an institution itself. International institutions have 
adopted aspects of sovereignty, granting them the right to hold their member states accountable 
for their actions and intervene in the domestic affairs of a member state when deemed necessary. 
Institutions are now expected to uphold their sovereign rights and maintain order and security 
among member states. These expectations created a deepening legitimacy problem for both 
ASEAN, as an institution, and Burma, as a state. 
ASEAN admitted Burma in order to encompass all of Southeast Asia, strengthening the 
credibility of ASEAN as a regional organization. ASEAN also saw admitting Burma as a way to 
decrease Burma's dependency on China, which in turn decreased Chinese influence and threat in 
the region as a whole. Burma, a country which for decades remained in isolation in an attempt to 
protect itself from outside influence, opened up by joining ASEAN. The Burmese regime 
acknowledged that it would be unable to survive in a world where mutual recognition was 
becoming the most important form of state sovereignty, increasing the need to engage with major 
dialogue partners and join the web of international institutions. However, ASEAN, as an 
organization, appealed to Burma because the diplomatic principles of ASEAN would allow 
Burma the right to its Westphalian sovereignty, or the right to manage its state affairs without the 
intervention of other states. Burma recognized the need for the legitimacy that it could obtain 
through becoming a player in the international arena in a system of institutions; however the 
regime wanted to legitimize its own right to rule, not succumb to the global trend of democratic 
rule. For this reason, the ASEAN values of non-interference and quiet diplomacy were vital to the 
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Burmese regime. 
 Unfortunately for the regime, the admittance of Burma caused ASEAN to be overwhelmed 
by an influx of international pressure and condemnation, threatening its credibility as an 
organization. Dialogue partners informed ASEAN leaders that the organization would be held 
responsible for the actions of Burma as a member state. ASEAN leaders were torn between 
upholding the ASEAN Way principles and remaining in good standing with major dialogue 
partners. As international criticism and pressure on the organization increased and ASEAN 
member states themselves underwent democratic reforms, ASEAN policies began to change. The 
leaders of ASEAN responded to international pressure by using the organization as their agent to 
apply pressure on and criticize the Burmese regime. The importance of ASEAN for Burma, 
particularly as a mechanism to gain international credibility, caused the regime reluctantly to 
liberalize. The regime recognized that the current global trend pointed towards democratization as 
the key to legitimacy in the system. The regime realized that democratizing would be the first 
condition for obtaining the legitimacy it desired. 
The Burmese military was able to maintain a dictatorship over the country for 48 years, 
the longest military dictatorship in modern history. The perseverance of the military regime for 
so long despite economic and diplomatic sanctions and individual state criticism, demonstrates 
the ineffectiveness of unilateral and bilateral actions in this case. Becoming a member of 
ASEAN, opened up the opportunity to use the organization and pressure it to produce 
liberalization in the new member state. The unilateral actions of Western actors, mainly 
sanctions, proved incapable of producing democratization. 
 Recognizing their power and influence, as important dialogue partners, over ASEAN's 
credibility as an institution, Western democratic actors used ASEAN as an agent to express 
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their criticism of the regime, threatening the credibility of the organization and the 
legitimacy of the individual countries’ role within it. This in turn caused the individual 
member states to also use ASEAN to hold Burma accountable to new international 
conditions behind international criticism. By using ASEAN as the mediator between Burma 
and the rest, the leaders of member states were able to justify their actions and statements as 
more credible in two ways. First, by using ASEAN as the messenger, instead of making 
unilateral efforts by individual countries, Burma felt increasing pressure to comply since 
ASEAN was its key to international legal sovereignty. Secondly, using ASEAN allowed the 
organization to uphold its credibility and sovereignty against pressures form the more 
powerful international actors concerned with Burma. 
The chronology of ASEAN events and responses in Part III confirm the hypothesis that 
the use of ASEAN by individual actors was the ultimate producer of democratization in Burma. 
Individual leaders utilized the “we” voice in their statements condemning Burma, creating the 
image of an ASEAN collective stance against Burma. These stances were particularly evident 
following the Depayin incident and in light of Burma's decision to relinquish its turn to chair the 
association in 2006. The decision by the Burmese regime to give up its right to the chair in was 
in response to the international criticism of ASEAN and of the other member states. The member 
states then used the credibility of ASEAN to pressure Burma to relinquish its turn. This event 
proved to the regime that membership in the association alone would not produce the desired 
recognition that it had hoped to obtain. The regime realized that proving itself worthy of chairing 
the organization would grant the regime the credibility and legitimacy it wanted as a state in the 
international system. 
 Since the passing of the 2008 Constitution, Burma has positively progressed down a 
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liberalization path. Although neither free nor fair, the elections in 2010 produced many liberal 
reforms, which continued after Thein Sein took power as president in 2011. Also in 2011, the 
regime requested the right to chair ASEAN in 2014, two years before its scheduled turn. Burma 
wanted to prove to the international community that it was fulfilling the conditions necessary to 
be a legitimate actor in the system. The regime hoped that being granted the chair would show 
dialogue partners that Burma was to be trusted and respected. Despite the ongoing ethnic 
conflict, which has complicated Burmese politics, the time period since ASEAN granted Burma 
the right to the 2014 Chair has witnessed an exponential growth of liberal reforms, particularly 
within the civil society. 
The framework and analysis developed in Part II is important for understanding the 
implications of the timing of democratization in Burma, as argued in Part III. The Burmese 
transition to democracy, viewed as a transformation, using Huntington's terminology, is 
important in understanding why the ASEAN Chair was of such high importance to the Burmese 
regime and why it wanted the chair in 2014. The analysis in Part II shows the military's 
continued stronghold on governing, even though transition has begun. Recognizing that 
democratization was a necessary condition for legitimacy and respected state sovereignty, the 
Burmese regime sought to use aspects of democracy to legitimize its own rule. The next set of 
national elections is scheduled for 2015, a year prior to the year Burma was originally scheduled 
to chair ASEAN. Because the regime ultimately viewed the Chair as the gateway to international 
legitimacy, it wanted to legitimize its own democratically facaded government. Chairing the 
organization in 2014, a year prior to the 2015 elections, would grant the current regime the 
legitimacy it desired. 
 The different components of Linz and Stepan's framework for transition and consolidation 
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when applied to Burma, further illustrate the current stronghold the military has on the affairs of 
the country. The constitution grants the military the ultimate power to dissolve the democratic 
government and re-administer military rule, and it reserves twenty-five percent of all seats in both 
houses for military elected representatives, giving the military the ultimate deciding voice in 
legislative decisions. The judiciary is not a separate branch and is controlled by military officials. 
The ethnic problem and issue of “stateness” is also a large hindrance to democratization in 
Burma. The determination of the current regime to centralize the government only increases 
tension between ethnic minorities and the government composed of mainly ethnic Burmans. 
Successful democratization cannot be achieved until the system becomes decentralized, 
acknowledging the rights of ethnic minorities, including their right to autonomous rule over their 
territories. Burma is comparable to Indonesia in ethnic diversity. Decentralization has proven to 
be effective there as part of the democratization process, so there is no reason why it cannot be 
successful in Burma as well. 
Understanding the current status of Burma, still early in democratization process, and 
what hinders the country from progressing further or completing transition and eventually 
consolidating democracy, is useful in analyzing the theory behind the country's decision to 
democratize. Although Burma is only two years into its transition, which began with the 2012 
by-elections, Burma has gained, to some extent, the international recognition it desired. Both 
the EU and US have relaxed diplomatic and economic sanctions on the country. The United 
States has changed its foreign policy with regards to Burma to one of engagement rather than 
isolation. Aung San Suu Kyi ran for and won a contested seat in the 2012 by-elections; 
subsequent dialogue between her and Thein Sein has been relatively open and cooperative. 
Most importantly, Burma did gain the ASEAN Chair at a summit meeting in Brunei in late 
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2013. Since officially becoming Chair in January 2014, Burma has proven itself capable of 
leading the organization. Burma has successfully held a Foreign Ministers Meeting and has 
planned a total of 280 meetings between the ASEAN ministers and between ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners. 
 Future Research: The successful opening up of the world's longest-running military 
dictatorship should not, however, be preemptively celebrated. As I have previously argued, 
Burma is still only two years into the successful start of a democratic transition, and there are still 
many hindrances to democratic progress. Unifying the country by resolving the ethnic problem, 
and amending the constitution, in order to produce the necessary political space for free and fair 
elections and a truly democratic government are the two main changes that must occur for 
transition to continue. Ethnic tension is mainly a result of the desire of the non-Burman ethnic 
communities to protect the autonomous rights they had before the Burmans attempted to 
centralize their newly independent state in order to maintain control over their new sovereign 
borders. Learning from the Indonesian example, democracy in Burma has a significant chance of 
success if the government decentralizes and grants ethnic-minority states autonomous rights with 
their own governing bodies. First, however, the regime must recognize the ethnic-minority states 
as legitimate members of the Burmese state, granting them equal rights as citizens of the country. 
The 2008 Constitution, the other major hindrance to democratization, will need to be 
amended to eliminate the power of the military from politics. Without changes, the constitution 
will preclude any further progress in transition. The conditions of the constitution are not agreed 
upon by all actors. The military reserves the right to dissolve the democratic government and 
appoint twenty-five percent of the representatives in both houses. The constitution also prohibits 
people with foreign citizenship, or with family members holding foreign citizenship, from 
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becoming president. This is a mechanism to prevent Aung San Suu Kyi from obtaining the 
presidency. From one perspective, the 2008 Constitution represents a clear case of transition by 
transformation. Utilizing a top-down approach to democratization, the military has legitimized 
its power in codified law with a democratic facade. But the transformation has only begun, and 
must be completed by removing its undemocratic characteristics, in order to produce a successful 
democratic transition. 
My argument that the regime desired the ASEAN Chair in order to obtain legitimacy as a 
respected and credible sovereign state is solidly supported by the evidence presented in this 
thesis. However, Burma's year as chair has just begun. Throughout 2014 it will be important to 
follow Burma's decisions as ASEAN Chair. It is equally as important to follow new domestic 
decisions and actions of the regime, either as form of reforms or setbacks. Furthermore, future 
research will be needed on domestic events leading up to the 2015 national elections. It will be 
important to analyze which actors will be able to run, how free and fair the elections are based on 
international standards and international observation teams, and how well the outcome is 
respected. 
Finally, it will be important to investigate what reforms play a role in producing change 
in the 2015 national elections compared to the 2011 national elections. Comparing the 
democratic aspects of both elections will assist in evaluating how democratic Burma really has 
become, and how certain we can be that Burma will continue to democratize. If democratization 
in Burma continues and becomes successful, it will suggest additional research on the 
capabilities of regional organizations and how regional institutions can be used instead of 
unilateral sanctions or direct intervention to spread liberal reforms to other authoritarian 
governments. The Burmese case presents an interesting example for future policy makers and 
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researchers to consider when looking for the variables that can successfully promote democratic 
reform within other rogue states. 
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